The Road Not Taken:
Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer Search Costs,
and the Challenge of the Internet
Michael Grynberg*
Yesterday I went shopping for soy milk. I usually buy the "Silk"
brand. A carton of plain Silk is light-red with white lettering. Beneath the
lettering is a picture of soy milk pouring and splashing into a bowl of
cereal. At the store's soy milk display, a light-red carton with white
lettering over a picture of soy milk pouring and splashing (but no cereal)
caught my eye. Closer inspection revealed that it was not Silk (which
was placed directly above in the store's display), but a store brand with
its own prominent trademark. I compared the ingredients (identical),
bought the cheaper Silk substitute, and saved a dollar. Though the
outcomes of trade dress cases are often hard to predict, the store brand's
copying of the Silk carton was likely legal.
Suppose instead that I do my grocery shopping on the Internet. Not
knowing where to buy soy milk (and not knowing any brand other than
Silk), I might have typed "Silk" and "soy milk" into a search engine. My
result list would likely include the Silk web page.1 But what if the store
brand had a web site that incorporated the word "Silk" on its page in
order to be included in my results list? Though no more confusing to me
as a consumer than the mimicked trade dress, this act would give Silk a
likely cause of action for "initial interest confusion." This article
critiques trademark claims based on initial interest confusion and
proposes a new framework, focused on consumer search costs, for
analyzing these claims.
Likelihood of confusion is the touchstone of trademark
infringement. But confusion is often transitory. Although a consumer
* Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr L.L.P., J.D. University of Virginia School of
Law, 1999. I wish to thank Kelly Baldrate, Matthew Kline, Mark Lemley, Daryl Levinson, and
David Roman for their helpful comments. Of course, the views expressed herein are my own and
should not be ascribed to my employer or its clients.
1. And indeed it does. In a Google search on July 19, 2004, www.silkissoy.com was at the top
of the results list.
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may make an initial mistake about a product's source, affiliation, or
sponsorship, she might still choose to buy the product after the true facts
are known. Nonetheless, some courts find trademark injury where there
is initial interest confusion. They hold that the initial confusion gives an
unfair "foot in the door" to infringers. 2
The popularization of the Interet as a marketing tool has increased
judicial interest in initial interest confusion. Courts aggressively police
defendants who use plaintiff trademarks in domain names or metatags,
which are hidden text on a web page designed to draw search engines to
a site. Web surfers never see the trademark used as a metatag (which is
invisible when reading the page), but may visit the site because it is
returned by the search engine in response to a query that includes the
trademark as a search term. Thus, a search for "Coca-Cola" could return
the "Pepsi" web site if that site includes "Coca-Cola" in its metatags.
Several circuits take the view that such inclusion infringes Coke's
trademark despite the fact that no one would mistake the Pepsi site for
Coca-Cola's. Nor does it matter that the cost to the consumer of any
diversion is no more than an extra click of a mouse. These holdings
potentially deprive consumers of an easy means to learn about web sites
in the same category as their search.3
The application of initial interest confusion to the Internet has
generated extensive criticism. 4 Most critics complain that courts have
failed to understand the nature of the Internet. But the problem is as
much a problem of doctrine as of technology. Courts applying initial
interest confusion to the Internet are fully consistent with the logic of the
cases that established the doctrine.5 That logic, unfortunately, is vague as
to why and when initial interest confusion should be enjoined. It is
therefore not surprising that the resulting body of law produces
questionable results. Simply put, if applying initial interest confusion to
the Internet was a mistake, it was an accident waiting to happen.
The rationale for policing initial interest confusion is not
immediately obvious. If there is no confused consumer at the point of
sale, where is the harm? The usual answer points to the trademark
owner's goodwill (the positive associations consumers have with the
trademark owner's product): A junior user should not free ride on the
senior user's goodwill as a means of getting his foot in the door with
6
prospective customers.
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I1.B.

4. See infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part 11.B.3.

6. See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
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But this explanation begs the question. The law does not prohibit
free riding across the board.7 What makes this brand of free riding
wrong? Is it always wrong? Courts have not provided coherent answers
to these questions.
The root of the problem is the doctrine's focus on trademark owner
goodwill and not on consumer interests. Just because a mark's goodwill
may attract a potential customer to further examine a product does not
guarantee a sale to the trademark owner. If an initially confused
consumer (who is not confused at the time of purchase) mistakenly looks
elsewhere at first but then chooses the alternative product,
notwithstanding any "bait and switch" tactics, the trademark owner's
goodwill could not have been that strong. Indeed, the consumer may
have been drawn to the trademark because it represented a category of
product and not a particular product.8 If so, the "confusion" may have
expanded the consumer's awareness of alternatives, thus promoting
competition and enabling the purchase of a preferable product. In such
cases, policing initial interest confusion potentially harms consumers by
cutting them off from a source of information about the broader market.
But permitting initial interest confusion may also harm consumers.
The class of initially confused consumers includes those who are
specifically seeking a particular brand to the exclusion of others. They
must expend extra effort to determine which product is which, and to
find their preferred choice. For these consumers, initial interest confusion
impedes the trademark's function of reducing consumer search costs.
This perspective suggests that a balancing is possible: Courts should
police initial interest confusion only when it produces greater harms than
benefits.
Focusing on goodwill does not provide any basis for balancing.
Instead, courts should consider the costs of dispelling initial confusion to
determine whether initial confusion causes a trademark injury. Under this
consumer-based search cost analysis, misappropriated "goodwill" is not
a factor except insofar as it represents the diversion of a consumer's
search "budget" from an intended recipient. Phrased another way, there
is point-of-sale confusion of sorts, but the "product" is further
exploration of a potential purchase, which is paid for with the
consumer's time and opportunity costs. 9 Consistent with this view,
several courts have refused to apply initial interest confusion on the
grounds that fleeting or de minimus initial confusion does not work a

7. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part I.C.1.
9. See infra Part I.C.2.
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trademark injury,' ° although some other courts have taken a more
aggressive approach."'
Whatever balance the courts have struck in initial interest confusion
cases has been upset by cases involving Internet domain names and
metatags. When the "confusion" results in a web surfer being directed to
the wrong web site, correction costs are negligible. Accordingly, one
would expect judicial reluctance to apply initial interest confusion. The
opposite is true. Claims of appropriated goodwill and misplaced
analogies to the "real" world persuaded several circuit courts to apply a
robust interpretation of initial interest confusion to cyberspace. 12 Their
holdings ignore, and at times reject, any consideration of search costs.
The perverse, if predictable, effect has been to invite broader claims of
initial interest confusion in cases involving the brick and mortar world.
Having welcomed broad claims in cyberspace, courts find reversing3
course difficult, especially without a clear doctrinal basis for doing so.'
Initial interest confusion cases involving the Internet may therefore have
ramifications extending far beyond the Internet context.
This article critiques the development and application of initial
interest confusion and argues for a doctrine based on consumer search
costs rather than a trademark owner's goodwill. Part I traces the origin of
initial interest confusion and presents a theory, based on minimizing
search costs, of when the concept should be applied. It then examines the
application of initial interest confusion in light of the courts' uncertainty
as to the purpose of the doctrine. Part II describes the doctrinal
difficulties caused by the uncritical adoption of initial interest confusion
to cases involving the Internet. These problems can be resolved by
focusing on search costs and the costs of correcting consumer confusion.
I. INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION IN THE BRICK AND MORTAR WORLD

A. The Goals of TrademarkLaw and the Lanham Act
Trademark law has multiple purposes. 14 Many of them can be
grouped under the general goal of consumer protection, though this goal
10. See infra Part I.D.
1I. See infra Part I.E.
12. See infra Parts 11.B & I1.C.
13. See infra Part II.E.

14. In a report on the bill that became the Lanham Act, the Senate Committee on Patents
explained:
The purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold. One is to protect the public so that it
may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the
owner of a trademark has spent energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product,

2004]

InitialInterest Confusion

subsumes benefits to merchants as well as consumers. 5 By identifying
products by source or brand, trademarks lower search costs and protect
consumer expectations. 6 Lowering search costs benefits producers by
enabling them to charge higher prices and compete on the basis of
product quality. 17

Trademark law also protects the goodwill symbolized by a
trademark-the positive associations a customer has with a specific
brand' 8 and the trademark holder's investment in the identifying power
of his mark.' 9 There is a latent tension between this goal and protecting
consumer interests, because excessive protection of goodwill may
endanger free competition 2--for example, by restricting comparative
advertising. 2'
The Lanham Act prohibits use "in commerce [of] any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale . ..or advertising of any goods or services"

where such use is likely "to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the
well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trademark owner.
S. REP. No. 1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274. The committee also called
trademarks
the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles
by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other. Trademarks encourage the
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which
excellence creates. To protect trademarks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to
foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation
and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who
have not.
Id. at 1275, quoted in Michael J. Allen, The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under Federal
Trademark Law: Who Must Be Confused and When? 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321, 324 (1991).
15. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§

2:33 (4th ed. 2004). The flip side of protecting consumers from confusion is "protecting the
trademark owner's right to a non-confused public." Id. § 2:14 (quoting James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign
of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976)).
16. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 2:3, 2:5.
17. Id. §§ 2:3, 2:4; Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[Trademark] makes
effective competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a means through
which the consumer can identify products which please him and reward the producer with continued
patronage. Without some such method of product identification, informed consumer choice, and
hence meaningful competition in quality, could not exist.").
18. "Good will is that which makes tomorrow's business more than an accident. It is the
reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past satisfactory dealings." ROGERS, GOOD
WILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914) quoted in I MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §
2:17.
19. "The redress that is accorded in trademark cases is based upon the party's right to be
protected in the good-will of a trade or business." Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 412 (1916). See also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2:30.
20. See Smith, 402 F.2d at 568-69.
21. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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deceive." To prevail on a claim for trademark infringement, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the similarity of the defendant's mark to the
plaintiff's creates a "likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as
to the source of the goods in question., 23 A multifactor test, with
different names in different jurisdictions, usually guides the inquiry.24
For example, the test announced by Judge Friendly in PolaroidCorp. v.
PolaradElectronics Corp.25 considers: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs
mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the competitive
proximity of the litigants' products; (4) any actual confusion; (5) the
likelihood that the plaintiff will "bridge the gap" separating the two
markets; (6) whether the defendant acted in good faith in adopting its
mark; (7) the quality of the defendant's product; and (8) purchaser
sophistication. 0 Courts apply variations of the Polaroid test to claims
involving both competing and non-competing goods. 27 The Lanham Act
also protects against infringement by providing a cause of action against
trade dresses that are confusingly similar to a plaintiff's distinct
packaging style or non-functional 28
source-identifying design features that
have acquired secondary meaning.
B. The Rise of Initial Interest Confusion
Likelihood of confusion typically focuses on the point of sale. But
in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway &
Sons, 29 the Second Circuit held that a trademark injury may exist when
consumers are initially, but not ultimately, confused by the similarities
between a senior and junior user's trademark.3 ° In other words,
infringement is possible even when any confusion is dispelled before

22. 15 U.S.C. § I11 4(l)(a) (1994).
23. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
24. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace:
Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 294 (1997-1998); Jason Allen Cody,
Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever Happened to TraditionalLikelihood of Confusion Analysis? 12
FED. CIR. B.J. 643, 654 n.42 (2003) (collecting tests).
25. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
26. Id. at 495; see also, e.g.,
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983);
AMF Inc. v. Sleekeraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
27. See, e.g., A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 207 (3d
Cir. 2000) ("[W]e conclude that the factors we have developed in the noncompeting goods context
are helpful tools and should be used to aid in the determination of the likelihood of confusion in
other cases."); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir.

1992).
28. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
29. 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).

30. Id.
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purchase.3 ' Steinway involved competing piano manufacturers.3 2 In
affirming the district court's conclusion that "Grotrian-Steinweg"
infringed upon "Steinway," the court ruled that confusion need not exist
at the time of purchase to be actionable.3 3 The court characterized the
problem of initial confusion as one of free riding by the junior user, not
as a harm to the consumer.
The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a
Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that
Grotrian had some connection with Steinway and Sons. The harm to
Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the
"Grotrian-Steinweg" name and thinking it had some connection
with "Steinway," would consider it on that basis. The "GrotrianSteinweg" name therefore would attract potential customers based

on the reputation built up by Steinway in this country for many
years. The harm to Steinway in short is the likelihood that potential
piano purchasers will think that there is some connection between
the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos. Such initial confusion
works an injury to Steinway.34

The court discussed initial interest confusion in the context of the
degree of care exercised by purchasers, which is one of the Polaroid
factors, but its holding rejected the defendant's assertion that because
confusion at the time of purchase was impossible, infringement was
impossible. 35 In other words, initial confusion sufficed as an injury that
merited relief under the Lanham Act.36
31. Initial interest confusion is not the only form of non-point-of-sale confusion to interest the
courts. Courts have also policed post-sale confusion as potentially endangering the reputation of a
trademark owner if shoddy products, which have already been purchased, are mistaken for the
trademark owner's goods. See, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1991).
32. Prior to Steinway, several cases addressed the possibility of harmful pre-sale confusion. See
Commun. Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1251 (4th Cir. 1970) (finding likelihood of
confusion in part because infringing mark (COMCET) sounded like mark of senior user (COMSAT)
and initial confusion might result in destruction of goodwill from spoken rumor about junior user);
see also Blaw-Knox Co. v. Siegerist, 300 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd in partand modf'd in
part, 414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969). See generally Charles E. Bruzga, Sophisticated Purchaser
Defense Avoided Where Pre-Sale Confusion Is Harmful-A Brief Note, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 659
(1988) (discussing early initial interest cases).
33. Steinway, 523 F.2d at 1342.
34. Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
35. Initial interest confusion is generally discussed in the context of a particular element of a
multifactor test. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998)
(actual confusion); Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
(consumer sophistication); Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154,
1162 (C.D. Cal. 2000), affd, Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., No. 00-55678, 2000 WL
1875821 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2000) (applying initial interest confusion to proximity and actual
confusion factors while identifying initial interest confusion as "[olne type of actionable consumer
confusion"); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying
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The Second Circuit's next discussion of initial interest confusion
also focused on the prospect that a junior user might gain unearned
credibility with purchasers. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum
Corp.37 involved an infringement claim based on the similarity between
the senior user's flying horse symbol and the defendant's "Pegasus"
mark.
The appeals court upheld a finding of likelihood of confusion based
on the prospect that Pegasus might free ride on Mobil's reputation during
initial contacts between purchasers and Pegasus. 38 "For example, an oil
trader might listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum-an
admittedly oft used procedure in the oil trading business-when
otherwise he might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum
is related to Mobil., 39 The court returned to this point in discussing the
purchaser sophistication factor of the Polaroidtest. Citing Steinway, the
court stated that initial confusion is a sufficient trademark injury despite
the sophistication of parties in the oil industry. 40 The fact that Pegasus

initial interest confusion to consumer sophistication factor and disclaimer defense). See also
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We
join these circuits in holding that initial interest confusion is probative of a Lanham Act violation.")
(emphasis added); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000)
(metatag use of another's trademark is probative of bad faith). Nonetheless, such confusion may be
an independent basis for a finding of infringement. See, e.g.,
Steinway, 523 F.2d at 1342. When
initial interest confusion is treated as an independent harm, it is not necessarily analyzed with the
multifactor test. See Brookfield Commun., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 n.24
(9th Cir. 1999) ("Because we agree that the traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for
analyzing the metatags issue, we do not attempt to fit our discussion into one of the Sleekcrafi
factors.").
36. Steinway, 532 F.2d at 1342. In its original form, the Lanham Act applied only when the use
of similar marks was "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasersas to the source
of origin of such goods or services." Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946) (emphasis
added). In 1962, Congress deleted the word "purchasers." S. REP. No. 2107 (1962), reprinted in
1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847. Though Congress did not specifically legislate that initial interest
confusion was actionable, some courts have used the amendment to support invocation of the
doctrine. See, e.g., Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 295. Not all courts read the amendment as necessarily
shifting the Lanham Act's focus away from the point of sale.
The legislative history states that the word "purchasers" was deleted because "the provision
actually relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers." Therefore, we do not
construe this deletion to suggest, much less compel, that purchaser confusion is no longer the
primary focus of the inquiry. Instead, we believe that, at least in the case of goods and services
that are sold, the inquiry generally will turn on whether actual or potential "purchasers" are
confused.
Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting S.
REP. No.2107 (1962), reprintedin 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847) (citation omitted).
37. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
38. Id. at 259.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 260.
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solicited business through cold calls and the "paramount importance" of
trust in the industry justified concern over initial confusion. 41
C. Initial Interest Rationales
Although Steinway and Mobil tilt toward the goodwill theory of
trademark protection, consumer protection is a more satisfying
explanation of why courts should monitor initial interest confusion,
especially when one considers the problem of search costs. Approaching
initial interest confusion from the perspective of search costs also
provides a clearer explanation of why and to what extent "goodwill,"
loosely understood, is at stake than does the Steinway or Mobil approach.
1. The Goodwill Rationale and Its Shortcomings
Neither Mobil nor Steinway were concerned with consumer
interests. Instead, as discussed above, both cases emphasize the prospect
that a junior user might free ride on the senior user's reputation. But this
begs the question. The law does not enjoin free riding in general.4 2
Indeed, one could argue that comparative advertising takes similar
advantage of a senior user's reputation to gain credibility with the
consumer.43 This brand of free riding is permissible even when it makes
use of another's trademark because the benefits to competition outweigh
judicial distaste for free riders.44 Nor does trademark law automatically
41. Id. at 260. See also Bruzga, supra note 32, at 660 (discussing "crucial credibility" at stake
in Mobil). The emphasis placed on trust raises the question of why a purchaser would trust Pegasus
once its lack of affiliation with Mobil was revealed.
42. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduitt Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995)
("[E]ffective competition and the penumbra of the patent laws require that competitors be able to
slavishly copy the design of a successful product."); I MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 1:2 (noting "the
principle of free copying-meaning that anyone's business ideas, inventions, writings and symbols,
once disclosed to the public, are in the public domain and may be freely copied."); id. § 8:19 ("[lit
must not be forgotten that there is nothing inherently unethical or illegal about copying per se.
Especially in the field of trade dress, one may copy a competitor's advertising or sales methods,
packaging concepts or product shape for many reasons other than to confuse consumers."); Wendy J.
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L.
REV. 149, 167 (1992) ("A culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited within it.").
43. "If you like X, you'll love Y."
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968), which allowed the marketing of a
perfume as a duplicate of Chanel No. 5. The court explained that concerns about free riding on the
Chanel name must yield to the public interest in free competition.
A large expenditure of money does not in itself create legally protectible rights. Appellees are
not entitled to monopolize the public's desire for the unpatented product, even though they
themselves created that desire at great effort and expense ....
By taking his 'free ride,' the
copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves an important public interest by offering comparable
goods at lower prices. On the other hand, the trademark owner, perhaps equally without
design, sacrifices public to personal interests by seeking immunity from the rigors of
competition.
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enjoin free riding on elements of a competitor's trademark or trade dress,
even when deliberately copied.4 5 Typically, there is a reason beyond
judicial sensibilities for enjoining free rides.46 Simply stating that free
riding occurs begins but does not end the inquiry.
Focusing on free riding responds to trademark law's concern that a
defendant not deprive a trademark owner of the benefit of her investment
in a mark's goodwill with the public.47 This is indeed a common
formulation of the harm caused by initial interest confusion. 48 But initial
interest confusion presents an odd setting for defending a trademark
holder's goodwill.
First, confusion may be dispelled at any time. It may be dispelled
instantly or it may linger until the late stages of negotiation. Protecting
goodwill qua goodwill offers no metric for distinguishing the situations.
Second, the fact that customer confusion is dispelled before a purchase
takes place calls into question the strength of the trademark owner's
goodwill. The "goodwill" that ultimately motivates the purchase belongs
to the purported infringer, not the trademark owner, because the
consumer has determined that the purported infringer is the one who
deserves her business.49 Worrying about dispelled confusion as a link in
the chain leading to the purchase of another's product at least raises
issues of proximate causation with which Steinway and Mobil did not
grapple. There is also, in the ordinary case, no depletion of the senior
user's goodwill. To the extent that there is blurring or tarnishment of the
mark, the senior user's claim is one for trademark dilution, not
infringement. 50
Id. at 568-69.
45. See infra note 72.

46. For example, patents and copyrights are justified by the need to incentivize invention and
other forms of creativity. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have
Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (declaring that the purpose of
copyright is to "motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward").
47. See supra note 19.
48. See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294-95 (3d
Cir. 2001) ("Without initial interest protection, an infringer could use an established mark to create
confusion as to a product's source thereby receiving a 'free ride on the goodwill' of the established
mark.").
49. The fact that the confusion is dispelled also means that the consumer does not think that the
alleged infringer has some connection with the trademark owner at the time of purchase. Cf
Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975)
(describing harm to trademark owner as prospect that consumer will consider infringer based on
perceived connection between the products).
50. Steinway was decided before the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ I 125(c)(1) (2004).
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Moreover, a defendant in an initial interest suit (where there is no
likelihood of point-of-purchase confusion) has grounds to argue that a
plaintiffs goodwill is not worth protecting. If the initial confusion is
truly analogous to "bait and switch" tactics, as some courts suggest, 5' one
would expect consumers who realize the deception to avoid the
purported infringer.52 If they do, no harm done (at least to the seller's
goodwill); if not, basing a cause of action on plaintiff goodwill is
problematic because the trademark owner does not appear to have much
goodwill with the consumer at the time of purchase.
One may argue further that the trademark holder's goodwill, as
representative of consumer belief in product or vendor quality, may not
be implicated at all. A consumer is less likely to be put off by initial
interest confusion if his initial interest was piqued by an association of
the mark with a particular product category rather than a particular
brand.53 For example, an Internet neophyte may seek out Internet
Explorer as her browser not because of any positive associations with
Microsoft products, but because that is the only browser she has ever
heard of and she is unaware of alternatives. If an initially confused
consumer is more interested in a product category than a particular
brand, one would not expect him to look elsewhere once the confusion is
dispelled. In that case, protecting the senior user's investment in the
goodwill of its mark is unnecessary, for the mark is functioning in a
manner analogous to a generic name. 54 Generic marks, of course, do not
merit trademark protection.55 Nor may a vendor plausibly claim a
reasonable expectation of the customer's patronage simply because hers
is the only brand the consumer knows. To hold as much would frustrate

51. See, e.g., Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996).
52. See supra note 41.
53. Cf Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1910) (allowing use of competitor's

trademark for advertising because defendants "are not trying to get the good will of the name, but the
good will of the goods.").

54. Cf West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1955)
("[O]ne who claims that another is guilty of unfair competition in copying his product, must show
that the consuming public is primarily concerned in the producer, rather than in the product
itself.... ").
55. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 12:1. By the same token, refusing to enjoin initial interest
confusion does not deter trademark holders from making optimal investments in goodwill insofar as
trademark holders are expected to take steps to ensure that their marks do not become generic. Id. §
12:26. Moreover, refusing to enjoin initial interest confusion still gives senior users an incentive to
invest in the goodwill necessary to make consumers purchase from them after any initial confusion
is dispelled.
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the goal of free and open competition and set consumer interests against
those of trademark holders.5 6
The goodwill-based theory of initial interest confusion presented by
Steinway and Mobil is therefore incomplete. The inattention of these and
other cases to the questions raised in this section suggests that the courts
may have been motivated less by the policy rationales of trademark law
than by an intuitive sense that consumer confusion, in all its forms, is
unfair. Lacking a precise basis for curtailing the behavior, the courts
simply enforced a judgment of what constitutes fair competition. Though
consistent with the tradition of the law of unfair competition, of which
trademark is a part, this practice left behind a deficient doctrine.57
This is not to say that initial interest confusion never affects a
trademark owner's reasonable expectations to the value of his goodwill.
But a better way to analyze the issue is to approach the problem from the
consumer's perspective rather than the trademark holder's perspective.
Goodwill is not so much an inappropriate consideration in these cases as
it is an unnecessary one.
2. The Search Cost Rationale
In light of the consumer-protection concerns at the heart of
trademark law,58 Steinway and Mobil's failure to consider consumer
interests is curious. Neither case articulated how initial confusion harms
consumers nor did either ruling consider the prospect that initial interest
confusion is sometimes in the consumer's interest. The district court in
Steinway acknowledged the possibility that initial interest confusion
could make consumers aware of alternative producers, though it did so as
an argument for enjoining initial interest confusion. "Misled into an
initial interest, a potential Steinway buyer may satisfy himself that the
less expensive Grotrian-Steinweg is at least as good, ifnot better, than a
Steinway., 59 Whatever the harm to Steinway, buying a better, cheaper
product is hardly contrary to the consumer's interest.
56. Of course this is not to say that a vendor does not deserve to benefit from her marketing
investment, but only to the extent that she convinces consumers that hers is the best product, not that
hers is the only product.
57. "The definition of a level of fair competition has been determined through a sifting of
ethics, economic theory, the 'Protestant Ethic,' and a vague Judeo-Christian feel for what is 'fair."' I
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 1:18. Indeed, many judges have an almost palpable scom for
trademark violators. "[W]here as here it plainly appears that there is a purpose to reap where one has
not sown ...the use of the advertising or trade name or distinguishing mark of another, is in its
nature, fraudulent and will be enjoined." Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto Fin., Inc., 123 F.2d
582, 584 (5th Cir. 1941).
58. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
59. Steinway, 523 F.2d at 1341 (quoting 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)) (emphases
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On the other hand, initial interest confusion is not a guided missile
precisely targeting only those consumers who will decide that the alleged
infringer's product is superior to that of the trademark holder's. It also
affects consumers who wish to purchase the trademarked brand and must
expend extra effort to find it. Their confusion, though ultimately
dispelled, increases search costs even when they ultimately purchase
from the trademark owner. Also, many of the diverted consumers would
have preferred the initial target of their search, but settle for the
infringer's product because finding the trademark holder would be too
much trouble. 60 It is these increased consumer search costs that justify
judicial attention to initial interest confusion. This rationale is consistent
with trademark law's consumer-protection goal.
Focusing on search costs also clarifies how initial interest confusion
may harm trademark holders. In making purchases, consumers
effectively pay two charges: (1) the price of a good or service and (2) the
costs of gathering information about the product and vendor, including
the transaction costs of inspection and negotiation. Strong trademarks
lower search costs and, consequently, total costs for consumers.
Likewise, lowering the search cost component of consumer expenditures
enables firms to command higher prices.6' Initial interest confusion
increases search costs for consumers, and by doing so lowers the price
that a trademark holder is able to charge.
Thinking about initial interest confusion in this manner creates a
framework for explaining how the junior user may be said to have
"misappropriated" something belonging to the senior user. A consumer's
purchase budget has two components: search costs and purchase price.
Increasing search expenditures reduces the funds that a consumer will
commit to purchase (thus shifting the consumer's demand curve to the
left).6 2 When a consumer visits a piano store thinking that it sells
Steinways, she has elected to spend that part of her search budget on
Steinway, not Grotrian-Steinweg. The longer she is confused, the greater
her potential investment of search costs. Depending on how much of that
budget remains after the confusion is dispelled, the consumer may not
expend the added effort of seeking the original target of her search. This
60. See infra text accompanying note 63.
61. William Landes and Richard Posner proposed an economic model of trademarks in which

71

= P + H(T: Y, W). t represents the full price of a good; P, the money price; and H, the search costs

incurred by the buyer. H is reduced when T, the mark, is strong. This is affected in turn by W,

representing the availability of words and symbols for use as a mark, and Y, representing other
factors. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-76 (1987). Strong marks that reduce search costs allow firms to command

higher prices. Id. at 277-79. That is, reducing H allows P to be larger.
62. See id. at 288.
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is so even if the senior user provides the product at a cheaper price. If the
cost of finding the senior user appears to exceed the cost differential
between the products, a rational consumer would not make the effort.
The senior user thus suffers a lost chance of a sale. Indeed, one may take
the view that a species of point-of-sale confusion has occurred. The
consumer purchases a closer look at a product at the cost of her time. If a
consumer chooses to "buy" a closer look at a Steinway, Steinway has a
legitimate complaint if Grotrian-Steinweg is the examined product. But
the extent of Steinway's grievance depends on the value of the diversion,
which in turn depends on the ease with which confusion is dispelled.
For her part, the consumer is harmed by the prospect that the
diverting product is inferior to the senior user's product (in either cost or
quality), but by a margin that is smaller than the added search costs she
would have to expend to explore its purchase. Considering search costs
thus values both consumer interests and a trademark owner's goodwill.63
The search cost rationale for policing initial interest confusion is
consistent with Professor J. Thomas McCarthy's explanation of initial
interest confusion.64 He justifies the doctrine by analogy to a job
applicant who puffs his r6sum6. Though the truth may be revealed before
an offer is made, the damage is done. "The misrepresentation has
enabled the job-seeker to obtain a coveted interview, a clear advantage
over others with the same background who honestly stated their
educational achievements on their resumes. In such a situation, it is not
possible to say that the misrepresentation caused no competitive
damage. ,,65 But the degree of harm is contextual. The interview is
coveted because the number of interview slots is finite. If the employer
had an unlimited number of interviews to give (and no opportunity costs
in giving them), then no competitive injury would result from the
misrepresentation.
This leads to a conclusion that is ignored by Mobil and Steinway:
Not all lost chances at a sale are of equal value. Their value depends on
the costs of the search and the ease with which the purchaser's confusion
is dispelled.
Why should relative costs matter? They matter because, as
discussed above, initial interest confusion may benefit the consumer.6 6
63. Initial interest confusion therefore has both global and local effects. Raising search costs
adversely affects efficient competition in cost and quality, while the individual consumer is less able
to buy her preferred product.
64.3 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:6.

65. Id.
66. Absent such benefits, the argument for aggressively policing initial interest confusion
would be stronger. Trademark users have a wide variety of words, symbols, and product
configurations from which to choose, enabling them to stay clear of potential infringement. The
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This dynamic may be seen in the trade dress of over-the-counter drugs. A
consumer buying a pain reliever initially may be looking for, say,
Tylenol. At the drug display, he sees a pain reliever with packaging
similar to Tylenol's, but closer inspection reveals that it is a cheaper
store brand. The store brand also contains acetaminophen, which is the
active ingredient of Tylenol. If the customer is satisfied that the generic
brand is an adequate Tylenol substitute, his "initial confusion" allows
him to save several dollars for a chemically identical product. Had he not
previously known about alternative acetaminophen options, any
confusion worked to his benefit by broadening his awareness of
Tylenol's competitors.67 The customer's preference, as expressed by his
informed purchasing decision, was not for Tylenol, but rather for the
most affordable acetaminophen product he could find. By resembling
Tylenol, the store brand's trade dress signals that it is in the same
category. In other words, it serves a generic function that benefits
consumers. 68 Courts have recognized this possibility in trade dress
cases, 690 and the same dynamic may be at play in initial interest confusion
cases.

7

contrary argument would then be based on the litigation and error costs arising from broadening the
set of potential infringements, raising litigation costs and the risk of penalizing marks that do not
actually cause confusion.
67. Returning to Landes & Posner's model, initial interest confusion may be an element of"Y"
(other factors) that lowers search costs by making consumers aware of low-cost alternatives to a
trademarked product. See supra note 61.
68. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. As the district court explained in Am.
Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1068 (D.N.J. 1987), affd, 834 F.2d 368
(3d Cir. 1987):
The resemblance between two products can alert consumers to the functional or utilitarian
equivalence between them, to the fact that one product may be substituted for the other in the
ultimate uses for which the products are intended. The free flow of information regarding the
substitutability of products is valuable to individual consumers and to society collectively, and
by providing it a supplier engages in fair competition based on those aspects-for example,
price-in which the products differ.
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-65
(1976).
69. See id. See also, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that packaging similarities that suggest product is similar to senior user's brand is
insufficient to prove likelihood of confusion when junior brand is marked with a distinct logo); id. at
1568-70 (discussing similar cases). The caselaw is far from uniform on this point, however. See
infra note 89.
70. Even potentially confusing names may have information content. If I am in the market for a
piano and like Steinways, but cannot afford them, I might investigate a Grotrian-Steinweg as a likely
similar product that may be cheaper. Or, I might have if the Steinway case had come out differently.
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If, however, the consumer genuinely prefers Tylenol, perhaps out of
concerns for quality control, 7 1 his search costs of finding it have not been
raised in any appreciable respect. He puts the generic down, sees the
Tylenol in the same area of the shelf, and life goes on. In this case, gains
from permitting some initial interest confusion likely outweigh the
coStS. 7 2 Because the effect on search costs is negligible, Tylenol does not
lose the ability to compete based on price, quality, or reputation. 73 This
conclusion is reinforced by the absence of displacement of the competing
product by the confusion. In contrast, Professor McCarthy's hypothetical
about the inflated r6sum6 describes a situation in which a
misrepresentation
effectively
displaces
a
competitor
from
74
consideration.
D. InitialInterest Skepticism. "Weak" InitialInterest Confusion
If the preceding analysis is correct, one would expect courts to be
sensitive to the costs of confusion when considering claims of initial
interest confusion.7 5 To a limited extent, they have been. In Astra
71. See Landes & Posner, supra note 61, at 275 ("That consumer will be interested not in the
formula but in the manufactured product and may therefore be willing to pay a premium for greater
assurance that the good will actually be manufactured to the specifications of the formula.").
72. Cf Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding trade dresses of "Tylenol PM" and "Excedrin PM" not confusingly similar despite
packaging similarities and defendant's bad faith in adopting elements of plaintiffs trade dress). But
see McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (enjoining
generic drug maker's packaging that was similar to senior user's).
73. To return to the soy milk shopping anecdote that opened this article, when I was shopping
for Silk soy milk, but purchased the store brand with a similar trade dress, there was initial interest
confusion. Though I knew almost immediately that I was not looking at Silk when I saw the store
brand, the carton caught my eye because I thought for an instant that I was. This "confusion"
benefited me. Had the store brand not mimicked the senior user's design, I likely would not have
noticed it. I would have bought the Silk and spent extra money. If, however, my heart was set on
Silk, the split second diversion of attention would not have increased my search costs in any
appreciable way. The Silk was on the shelf immediately above the substitute. Indeed, by having two
shelves of Silk-style soy milk rather than one, the store arguably made the Silk easier to find.
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Of course, this point can be taken to an extreme.
At the moment a generic pain reliever is in a consumer's hand, Tylenol is not. But the products are
side by side in a way that is not possible when a consumer visits, say, a Grotrian-Steinweg store
thinking that it is a Steinway shop.
75. Though Mobil and Steinway do not discuss the search cost rationale, their results are not
necessarily inconsistent with it. One could conclude, for example, that visiting a store that sells
Grotrian-Steinwegs on the mistaken assumption that they are the same as Steinways raises search
costs to a degree that outweighs any possible countervailing benefits. See Steinway, 523 F.2d at
1342. Similarly, one might argue that listening to misleading sales pitches results in higher search
costs than alternative means of promoting an oil company. See Mobil, 818 F.2d at 259. Other forms
of diversion, by contrast, may not result in sufficient costs to justify judicial intervention. See, e.g.,
Mayflower Transit, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Warehouse Co., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (S.D. Ind.
1995) (successor's temporary use of another interstate carrier's phone number unlikely to cause
confusion "because customers are likely to use great care when selecting a van line, any initial
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Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,76 for
example, the First Circuit refused to give credence to evidence of
confusion when the confusion was minimal and dispelled before
purchase. 77 Astra Pharmaceutical sued to prevent Beckman Instruments
from selling a blood analyzer with the name ASTRA (an acronym for
"Automated Stat/Routine Analyzer"). 78 The record revealed some
evidence of actual confusion-two purchasing directors and several lab
technicians mistakenly associated Astra salesmen with the Beckman
product. But there was no evidence of point-of-sale confusion. 79 The
court concluded that "any confusion which may have occurred was de
minimis, and is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact relating to
the likelihood of confusion issue." 80
Though Astra did not address the underlying rationales for initial
interest confusion, the court's refusal to apply the concept is consistent
with the search cost rationale-de minimis confusion is not worth
worrying about. Other cases have taken a similar approach. Situations in
which the initial confusion could raise search costs are enjoined, while
instances of de minimis or easily dispelled confusion are not. 81 Likewise,
confusion originating from the inaccurate Yellow Pages listing would be dispelled as the customer
encountered actual representatives from individual van lines for purposes of finding the lowest
bidder.").
76. 718 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 1208.
78. Id. at 1204.
79. Id. at 1207.
80. Id. at 1208.
81. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1993) (despite
creator's statement that "MIKE" mark was to trick those glancing from across room to think shirt
was NIKE, "a jury could surely conclude that any initial confusion ends with a closer look, when the
observer 'gets it"'); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11 th Cir.
1982) ("Short-lived confusion or confusion of individuals casually acquainted with a business is
worthy of little weight... "); Mayflower Transit, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Warehouse Co., Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 1134, 1143 (S.D. Ind. 1995); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(mark of airplane kit builder Seawind not infringed by kit assembler Turbine Seawind when initial
confusion could not cause loss of business).
Though courts have not specifically employed search cost analysis, cases finding initial interest
confusion have considered consumer inconvenience. See, e.g., Blockbuster Entm't Group v. Laylco,
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 513 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1994) ("[B]ecause it would be inconvenient to leave one
video store to find another, those customers lured to a Video Busters store may rent video cassettes
from that store despite having realized that it bears no connection to Blockbuster."). Likewise, some
cases that appear to take a strong view and treat initial interest confusion as a form of
misappropriation may be explained in terms of search costs. For example, Elvis Presley Enters., Inc.
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998), involved a restaurant that used the name "The Velvet
Elvis." The assignee of the intellectual property rights of the Presley estate ("EPE") sued on
infringement grounds. The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the actual confusion prong of the multifactor
likelihood-of-confusion test relied heavily on the initial confusion of patrons who entered the
restaurant thinking that it might have Elvis merchandise for sale, but upon entering "had no doubt
that EPE was not affiliated with it in any way." Id. at 204. Despite the dispelling of any confusion,
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several courts have considered the sophistication of purchasers as a
reason to reject claims based on initial interest confusion. This practice
makes sense in the context of the search cost analysis. Because
sophisticated purchasers will be more aware of the potential for initial
confusion, and better able to alleviate it, their search costs will not
significantly increase.
Even courts that embrace the free-riding rationale employ reasoning
that suggests that search-cost considerations factor into their analysis. In
announcing that it would consider initial interest confusion as probative
of whether the Lanham Act has been violated, the Third Circuit
emphasized its concern that junior users not be able to "free ride on the
goodwill" of senior users. 83 But in applying the doctrine, the court
emphasized two factors: product relatedness and level of consumer
care. 84 Consumer care, like consumer sophistication, affects the search
costs expended by the consumer before initial confusion is dispelled.
Similarly, a consumer who is diverted to an unrelated product will have
his confusion dispelled fairly quickly. 5 In both situations, a finding of

the court noted that "this initial-interest confusion is beneficial to the Defendants because it brings
patrons in the door; indeed, it brought at least one of EPE's witnesses into the bar. Once in the door,
the confusion has succeeded because some patrons may stay, despite realizing that the bar has no
relationship with EPE." Id. Though the court did not analyze the costs to consumers of this purported
misdirection, it pointed out that the initial error sometimes carried direct financial costs. "This
initial-interest confusion is even more significant because the Defendants' bar sometimes charges a
cover charge for entry, which allows the Defendants to benefit from initial-interest confusion before
it can be dissipated by entry into the bar." Id. In this, of course, the purported initial interest
confusion may also be seen as actionable point-of-sale confusion.
82. See Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999). The
court rejected a claim based on initial interest confusion because of customer sophistication:
Here, however, retailers-more specifically, those retailers who actually care about the source
of the baskets-are in a better position than the typical consumer either to order the correct
goods, or to return the incorrect goods and receive the intended goods. See, e.g., Astra Pharm.
Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting a
temporary confusion claim because the purchasers were sophisticated). Indeed, an affidavit
submitted by a Syndicate Sales witness indicates that many retailers did, upon inspection, send
back the baskets that they did not want. For the limited number of retailers that care about the
source of the baskets, post-sale inspection is sufficient.
Id. at 638; see also Rust Env't & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir.
1997). But see, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Manny's Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (finding that telephone calls to junior user suggested initial confusion and disputing that
Porsche customers have a high standard of care).
83. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir.
2001).
84. See id. at 296.
85. But, admittedly, unrelated products are unlikely to lead to the expansion of the consumer's
evoked set of product options represented by the trademark.
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infringement will not lower search costs as it might if the confusion was
86
of unsophisticated purchasers choosing among product substitutes.
To be sure, the court did not neglect goodwill altogether, as it found
relevant the fact that the defendant did not try to trade on the plaintiffs
goodwill. But the court emphasized the de minimis nature of the
confusion that occurred.8 7 Further, as argued above, goodwill is
appropriately a factor in initial confusion analysis when properly
understood as a factor that draws expenditures of search costs, not actual
88
purchases.
Sensitivity to search costs may also explain the outcome in trade
dress cases that raise similar issues as initial interest confusion cases.
Many of these precedents recognize that a junior user's product may
copy some aspects of the senior user's trade dress so long as any
potential confusion will be dispelled by a prominently displayed distinct
89
trademark or logo.
Of course, a trademark or logo is not necessarily the first thing that
a potential customer will notice. It might be a similar color scheme or
product design. Until other product information becomes available,
confusion, however fleeting, may result. Trade dress cases that permit
limited copying of product packaging necessarily accept some potential
for initial interest confusion. Consistent with the search cost rationale,
however, they recognize that these potentially confusing features provide
informational value to consumers by signaling that the junior user's
86. See id. at 297 ("Where confusion has little or no meaningful effect in the marketplace, it is
of little or no consequence in our analysis.").
87. See id. at 297-99.
88. See supra text accompanying note 63. These cases raise the issue of how courts should
apply the search cost rationale. The purpose of this article is to argue that courts should police initial
interest confusion, if at all, in order to minimize search costs, which requires consideration of the
ease with which any confusion is dispelled and consideration of whether the challenged practice
carries any information benefits to the consumer. Assessing the various methods that courts might
use to conduct this balancing is outside the scope of the current inquiry. That said, courts could
apply a variety of doctrinal tools in addition to taking economic testimony or survey evidence. For
example, as argued in the text, courts should refuse to find initial interest confusion where the effects
on search costs are de minimis. In assessing whether search costs are raised, courts might consider
the degree of product displacement caused by the challenged act. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text. Consumer sophistication may also continue to be a factor. Whatever evidentiary
methodology emerges, the resulting doctrine will have something the goodwill rationale lacks: a
standard for determining when judicial intervention is warranted.
89. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992); cf McNeil-PPC, Inc. v.
Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (faint mark on pill with similar design to senior
user unlikely to dispel potential post-sale confusion). As the last citation indicates, there is
considerable variation in this area, and the placement of a label does not necessarily resolve the
matter in the defendant's favor. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:53.
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product is in the same category as that of the senior user. 90 Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit has noted that consumer expectations may make initial
interest confusion unlikely in trade dress cases. 9'
E. Initial Interest Enthusiasm: "Strong" Initial Interest Confusion
The search cost rationale does not perfectly explain initial interest
cases prior to the popularization of the Internet. Although both Steinway
92
and Mobil were arguably consistent with the search cost rationale,
neither case embraced it. Consequently, a court applying them could find
actionable initial confusion whenever consumer diversion occurs, no
matter how inconsequential. Several cases have adopted this "strong"
form of the doctrine.
In Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc.,9 comedian Jeff Foxworthy sued
a T-shirt manufacturer for selling shirts that displayed phrases akin to his
"you might be a redneck" jokes. The court granted a preliminary
injunction in Foxworthy's favor on both copyright and trademark
grounds. In analyzing the actual confusion prong of the circuit's
multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test, the court emphasized potential
initial interest confusion. A witness testified that he saw the purportedly94
infringing shirts, but was nearly certain that they were not Foxworthy's.
No matter. "[I]n the present case, [the witness] immediately associated
the jokes with the plaintiff, and was fairly convinced that the shirts were
not 'the real McCoy' for other reasons. Thus, in one respect, the mere
fact that [his] suspicions were aroused because of the association
indicates confusion on a legally cognizable level. 95
The court appeared primarily concerned with the defendant's
apparent free riding on its shirts' resemblance to Foxworthy products.9 6
But the court's equation of all forms of confusion, no matter how easily
dispelled, is noteworthy. "The important thing is that, whether the
consumer discerns the truth or gives it no thought whatsoever, the fact
that some mental process must be performed in order to understand the
association indicates not only an unfair competitive advantage but the
90. See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1068 (D.N.J. 1987),

affd, 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The resemblance between two products can alert consumers to
the functional or utilitarian equivalence between them. ... The free flow of information regarding
the substitutability of products is valuable to individual consumers and to society collectively... ").
91. See Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting initial

interest confusion claim because "where product configurations are at issue, consumers are generally
more likely to think that a competitor has entered the market with a similar product").
92. See supra note 75.
93. 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

94. Id. at 1215.
95. Id. (second emphasis added).
96. See id.
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actual embodiment of confusion. 97 Under goodwill analysis, forcing
"mental process[es]" upon consumers suffices for a trademark injury.9 8
Other cases have taken the extreme view that mere evocation of
another party's mark or trade dress may constitute infringement. 99
F. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the unconvincing rationale proffered by the courts
for enjoining initial interest confusion, cases applying the doctrine are
often, but not always, explainable by weighing the increased search costs
from the confusion against the potential consumer benefits of increased
product information. This rough balance, however, remained
unarticulated. As a result, courts had little doctrinal basis for choosing
between broad or restrictive applications of the doctrine. This ambiguity
left judges ill-prepared to apply initial interest confusion to the large
number of claims based on trademark usage on the Internet. Advocates
of strong initial interest confusion proved able to turn this doctrinal
uncertainty to their advantage.
II.

INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION IN CYBERSPACE

By now it is something of a clich6 to observe that the Internet raises
controversy about how legal doctrines designed for the "real" world
should apply to cyberspace. Initial interest confusion is one of several
examples. Claims based on purported initial interest confusion are
increasingly popular as plaintiffs attempt to police the use of their
trademarks on the Internet. Unfortunately, many of the resulting
decisions have lost the rough balancing of search costs against consumer
benefits that partially mediated the application of initial interest
confusion to the brick and mortar world. Though many commentators
97. Id. at 1216.
98. Id. In a similar vein, see McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Guardian Drug Co., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1066,

1074 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("Even if the consumer realizes that the [generic drug] is not the same as the
national brand once he picks the product up off the shelf and reads the label, Defendant has already

accomplished what it set out to do, which is confuse the consumer at the point when he first reaches
for the product on the shelf. It is at this point that the damage is done.").
99. Prior to its broad application of initial interest confusion to the Internet, discussed infra, the

Ninth Circuit listed potential initial confusion as a factor in finding trademark infringement and
identified the harm as the "capture [of] initial consumer attention." Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997). The court provided no analysis of how much
attention was required nor why such capture was actionable; it simply cited Mobil. Id. See also, e.g.,
Philip Morris Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting

preliminary injunction against "GUNSMOKE" cigarettes brought by manufacturer of
"MARLBORO" and noting plaintiff's argument that new entrant "achieves an unfair advantage by
means of a trade dress playing off consumers' consciousness, albeit perhaps subliminal, of the
MARLBORO trade dress") (emphasis added).
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correctly take these opinions to task for not understanding the nature of
the Internet, the problem is fundamentally doctrinal. Having never
articulated a cogent basis for the initial interest doctrine, courts left
plenty of precedential space for an overly aggressive application to the
Internet.
A. Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet
1.Purported Sources of Initial Confusion
To date, two forms of purported initial confusion have dominated
judicial discussion of the doctrine as applied to the Internet: metatags and
domain names. 100 Metatags are HTML 10' code that describe a web site's
contents. Description metatags describe the web site while keyword
metatags are words that relate to the contents of the web site., 0 2 These
tags are invisible to web surfers, but are readable by search engines.
Thus, a web surfer who types "Golden Retriever" into a search engine
will receive a list of web sites that the engine's search algorithm deems
responsive to the search. In addition to selecting pages based on their
readable content, the search algorithm may also consider metatags.10 3 If it

on the list by using the term
does, then a web site can place 10itself
4
"Golden Retriever" in its metatags
Web site owners use metatags in order to draw attention to their
pages. Ideally this practice helps index the millions of pages on the
Internet. One would hope that the tag "Golden Retriever" would be used
by sites that have something to do with Golden Retrievers. But some site
owners place common search terms into their metatags even though their
sites have little, if anything, to do with the tag, a practice known as
"spamdexing."'' 5 For example, several hours after Princess Diana's
100. Litigation is increasingly common for other practices. See infra notes 194-199 and
accompanying text.
101. Hypertext Markup Language, the code in which web sites are programmed to allow web

browsers to present them graphically.
102. For a good overview of metatag use and Internet searching in general, see F. Gregory
Lastowka, Note, Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What's the Meta For? 86 VA. L. REV.

835, 843-54 (2000).
103. Id. at 850. Many do not. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines Under Siege: Do Paid
Placement Listings Infringe Trademarks? 14 INTELLECTUAL PROP. & TECH. L. J. Issue 7, at 2

(2002) (stating that many search engines claim not to recognize metatags).
104. Some search engines also sell placements or advertisements based on a search. Thus, a
breeder of Golden Retrievers could purchase an ad that would be displayed whenever someone types
"Golden Retriever" into a search engine. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 55
F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev 'd,354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
105. See Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines
with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 46 (1998).
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death, many web sites used "Princess Diana" as a metatag
hoping to lure
06
her.'
about
information
for
looking
were
visitors who
Trademarks are sometimes used as metatags. Web site owners may
incorporate the name of a competitor's mark into the site's metatags in
the hope of drawing web surfers who are in the market for the same
product or service sold by both the trademark owner and the junior user.
Such use 10has
generated infringement claims based on initial interest
7
confusion.
The second major battleground over Internet initial interest
confusion is over the domain names that identify web sites. Trademark
owners have litigated against the practice of junior users who use the
owners' trademarks, or similar marks, as domain names. 0 8 This practice
is said to cause initial interest confusion because the web surfer thinks he
will reach the trademark owner's site
when he types the trademark into
09
his web browser as a domain name.'
2. Is the Internet Different?
The Internet is not the first electronic communications medium to
raise issues of initial interest confusion." 0 Courts have addressed initial
interest confusion concerning phone numbers, which serve a similar
function to domain names. Mayflower Transit, Inc. v. Ann Arbor
Warehouse Co."' involved a dispute between two interstate carriers. The
plaintiff, Mayflower, employed an Ann Arbor booking agent who sold
the use of its phone numbers to another local booking agent, Phoenix,
who worked for a different carrier, Red Ball. For a time after the sale,
Ann Arbor customers seeking a Mayflower agent reached a Red Ball
agent when they dialed the "Mayflower" number listed in the Yellow
Pages.1 2 Mayflower brought Lanham Act claims based on the resulting
potential confusion. Note that the confusion at issue is directly analogous
to that in a domain name case. A potential customer initiates an
electronic contact with the expectation she will reach one company, but
in fact reaches another company.
The district court ruled, however, that the resulting initial confusion
was too easily dispelled to sustain a Lanham Act claim.

106. Lastowka, supra note 102, at 853. Most of these sites were pornographic. Id.
107. See infra Part lI.B.1.
108. See infra Part ll.B.2.

109. See id.
110. But see O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 309 (arguing that "[metatagging] has no obvious

'hard copy' counterpart, thereby making it difficult to assess from conventional legal doctrines").
111. 892 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
112. Id. at 1137.
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There can be no denying, however, the existence of several factors
that lessen the likelihood that the public would confuse the two
companies. For example, both Phoenix and its interstate carrier, Red
Ball, have completely different names and service marks than
Mayflower. Indeed, Phoenix's affiliation with Red Ball appears
prominently on Phoenix's invoices, service order forms and trucks.
That affiliation also appears in Phoenix's current advertising, in the
Yellow Pages and otherwise, and on the large free-standing sign
designating Phoenix's location. Moreover, testimony given at the
hearing revealed that consumers often have three or four carriers
submit estimates on the expected cost of a move. Thus, because
customers are likely to use great care when selecting a van line, any
initial confusion originating from the inaccurate Yellow Pages
listing would be dispelled as the customer encountered actual
representatives from
individual van lines for purposes of finding the
3
lowest bidder."
If anything, the search costs implicated by Mayflower are higher
than those present in an Internet case. The initially confused customerwho was diverted from her intended target-would lack any confusiondispelling visual information until she had actually seen one of the
movers' vehicles. In contrast, a misdirected web surfer will have more
immediate clarifying information in front of him upon arriving at the
"wrong" web site. Indeed, the Mayflower court found relevant that the
defendant had confusion-resolving information available to misdirected
callers."l 4 As with Mayflower, one would expect most initial interest
cases involving the Internet to be sensitive to the ease with which
confusion is dispelled. Not so.
B. Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.
The application of the initial interest confusion doctrine to Internet
cases has primarily focused on the goodwill rationale. Brookfield
Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.115 is the leading
case on initial interest confusion and the Internet.' 16 The case involved a
113. Id. at 1143.
114. See id. (noting that Phoenix employees made their affiliation clear and that customers who

mentioned Mayflower were given the company's national or Michigan phone number). Cf Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim that defendant's use
of 1-800-H[zero]liday violated Lanham Act in light of plaintiff's rights to 1-800-HOLIDAY when

defendant did not cause confusion).
115. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
116. Prior to Brookfield, several district courts in the Ninth Circuit had considered the use of

trademarks as domain names or in machine readable code. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Calvin
Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see also, e.g., Green Prods. Co. v.
Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Jeffrey Kuester & Peter
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trademark dispute between a seller of entertainment industry information
(Brookfield) and a chain of video stores (West Coast). The parties
disputed the right to use the trademark "MovieBuff' both as a domain
name and in web site metatags. Brookfield used "MovieBuff" as a mark
for
a
searchable
database
containing
entertainment-related
information.117 West Coast claimed the right to use the term online based
on its service mark "The Movie Buffs Movie Store."' 1 8 West Coast also
had a searchable database available on its web site." l9
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Brookfield had rights to the name,
and ruled that West Coast's use of the domain name "moviebuff.com"
120
created a likelihood of confusion under the court's multifactor test.

The court then turned to initial interest confusion in its analysis of West
Coast's use of marks similar to "MovieBuff' in its HTML code.
1. Goodwill and Search Costs Revisited
The court acknowledged that for web pages that did not use "movie
buff' as part of the domain name, no actual confusion was possible. 121
The court still found the use of metatags actionable due to the supposed
initial interest confusion of web surfers who use search engines.
Web surfers looking for Brookfield's "MovieBuff' products who
are taken by a search engine to "westcoastvideo.com" will find a
database similar enough to "MovieBuff' such that a sizeable
number of consumers who were originally looking for Brookfield's
product will simply decide to utilize West Coast's offerings instead.
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers
know they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there
is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using
"moviebuff.com" or "MovieBuff' to divert people looking for
benefits from
"MovieBuff' to its web site, West Coast improperly
22
the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark.1

Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA: J.L. &
TECH. 243, 275-76 (1998) (discussing early metatag litigation); Nathenson, supra note 105, at 67-

71 (same).
117.
118.
119.
120.

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1061.

121. Id. at 1062 ("Since there is no confusion resulting from the domain address, and since
West Coast's initial web page prominently displays its own name, it is difficult to say that a
consumer is likely to be confused about whose site he has reached or to think that Brookfield
somehow sponsors West Coast's web site.").
122. Id. The court also invoked goodwill in determining that West Coast's use ofr"moviebuff'
in a domain name would create a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1057.
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The court's invocation of goodwill raises the question at the heart
of initial interest confusion since Steinwa--why prohibit benefiting
from Brookfield's goodwill in this manner? The court relied largely on
moral judgment. Diversion of web surfers is "improper[].' 23 Beyond
intuition, the court employed analogy rather than analysis, comparing
metatags to billboards:
Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a
sign with another's trademark in front of one's store. Suppose West
Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a billboard
on a highway reading-"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit
7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is
located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull
off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West
Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway
entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer
West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching
for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there. Customers
are not confused in the narrow sense: They are fully aware that they
are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe
that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West
Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial consumer
confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster
would be
124
misappropriating West Coast's acquired goodwill.
The billboard analogy captures the potential harm of initial interest
confusion, but overlooks why that harm did not exist in Brookfield. The
harm in the billboard hypothetical can be understood in terms of the
search cost rationale for initial interest confusion.125 The billboard affects
the customer looking for West Coast in two ways that are relevant from a
trademark perspective. 2 6 First, "consumers who prefer West Coast may

123. Cf O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 295 (discussing common intuitions that metatagging is
wrongful conduct).
124. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064.
125. See supra Part l.C.2.

126. This isnot to say that other legal
perspectives-fraud and false
advertising in particularcould not apply to the situation. Perhaps some of the judicial distaste for initial interest confusion
defendants is based on a sense that their conduct is akin to fraud or false advertising. But to whatever
extent initial interest confusion evokes or resembles fraud or false advertising, it is neither.
Although the more likely cause of action for the false billboard would seem to be for false
advertising, this action appears problematic in the metatag context because it is hard to discern what
the false statement is. Use of a trademark in one's metatags may "say" any number of things. If the
web site for Pepsi includes "Coca-Cola" in its metatags, its "statement" is much more likely "we are
a cola like Coca-Cola" than the clearly incorrect "we are Coca-Cola." Julie A. Rajzer, Comment,
Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts Are Overprotecting Trademarks Used in Metatags,
2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 427, 462 ("[C]ourts should have no reason to preclude Pepsi
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find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast."' 27 In
other words, as a result of the initial confusion, the consumer's search
costs have increased. Anyone truly looking for West Coast-including
those who are well aware of Blockbuster-must expend additional costs
to find it. These consumers are thus harmed by the billboard stratagem.
Some of them will find that the total "cost" of renting from West Coast
(search costs plus the actual price) would exceed their budget for a movie
rental. As a result, they will rent from Blockbuster even though that is
not their preference. Indeed, if search costs are sufficiently high,
Blockbuster could charge higher prices than West Coast and still sell to
differential is not worth the expense of
consumers for whom the 1 price
28
locating the cheaper store.
One must remember, however, that the effects of initial interest
confusion are not uniformly negative. The second effect of the false
billboard is to expose consumers to an alternative product choice.
Suppose, hypothetically (and counterfactually), that Blockbuster were an
upstart brand. Suppose further that it offers a wider selection at cheaper
prices than West Coast. 129 The initially confused consumers may well be
grateful for such confusion. At the very least, they have become aware of
the availability of a video store alternative at the hypothetical highway
exit.
What about goodwill? The harm to West Coast in the hypothetical
is not that a consumer may conclude that Blockbuster is just as good or
better than West Coast. That is competition. The harm is that the
consumer, though choosing to spend her search budget on West Coast, is
tricked into making a search expenditure on Blockbuster's behalf. That is
misappropriation. Simply calling the problem one of misappropriated
goodwill confuses more than it clarifies. Using the term broadly
overlooks both the potential benefits of confusion and the situations in
which analogous free riding on goodwill is not forbidden by trademark

law. 130
Indeed, Brookfield acknowledged that West Coast could have used
the movie buff trade name for comparative advertising of its own

from putting 'Coke' in its metatags. Consumers who type 'Coke' into a search engine may want to
see all similar products."). See also infra note 148.
127. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064.
128. To illustrate, suppose that Blockbuster rents videos for $4.00 each and West Coast
charges $3.75. A consumer may prefer West Coast for that reason, but, because of Blockbuster's
deception, could decide that looking for West Coast is not worth saving a quarter.
129. 1 do not know how Blockbuster compares to West Coast in reality.
130. See supra notes 42-45, 66-74 and accompanying text.
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service. 13 1 But that fair use would also have drawn the attention of web
surfers who typed "movie buff' into search engines and could have
resulted in the same "harm" to Brookfield as would the use of metatags.
The "free ride" would still have occurred. 132 To say that such free rides
may nonetheless be fair uses suggests that balancing must be employed,
but the goodwill perspective of Brookfield provides no guideposts for the
inquiry. The court33should not have used absolute terms to describe a
contextual matter. 1

When determining whether the goodwill appropriation caused by
metatags should be enjoined, the proper question is whether the costs of
confusion outweigh the benefits. In some cases, like the billboard
hypothetical, the costs of confusion likely outweigh any benefits. In
others, particularly when there is no displacement of a competing
product, like generic drugs that draw attention because their packaging
resembles better-known brands, 134 the benefits of "confusion" probably
outweigh the costs.
Using trademarks in metatags is more like similarly packaged pain
relievers that share a store display than deceptive billboards. First, the
search costs imposed upon consumers are low. As the Brookfield court
acknowledged, confusion among web sites is unlikely.' 35 Any web surfer
is likely to know "immediately"' 36 whether he or she has reached a
131. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066 ("For example, its web page might well include an
advertisement banner such as 'Why pay for MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for
FREE?'); see also Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 814 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002) ("It is

not the case that trademarks can never appear in metatags, but that they may only do so where a
legitimate use of the trademark is being made.").
132. Cf Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1968) ("By taking his 'free ride,' the

copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves an important public interest by offering comparable goods at
lower prices. On the other hand, the trademark owner, perhaps equally without design, sacrifices
public to personal interests by seeking immunity from the rigors of competition.").
133. Some courts applying Brookfield have found fair use of trademarks in metatags or site
text. See, e.g., J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125-27 (N.D. Cal. 2003)

(holding competitor's use of trademarked tax service's name to be nominative fair use); Trans Union
L.L.C. v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Il. 2001) (metatag use is fair when

allegedly infringing site is affiliated with trademark owner and offers products derived from
trademark owner's database).
Complaints about free riding in search engines may ring hollow to some, for free riding is
hardly uncommon on the Internet. See O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 303; see generally LAWRENCE
LESsIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)
(arguing that the Internet represents an information commons endangered by excessive efforts to
control intellectual property).
134. See supra note 73.
135. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 ("Since there is no confusion resulting from the domain
address, and since West Coast's initial web page prominently displays its own name, it is difficult to
say that a consumer is likely to be confused about whose site he has reached or to think that
Brookfield somehow sponsors West Coast's web site.").
136. Id. at 1057.
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desired page. 37 The search costs of leaving one page and returning to a
search engine-generated list requires only a point and a click, not
physical relocation. 38 Moreover, search engines typically display results
as a list that includes excerpts of the page in question, minimizing the
possibility of errant clicks. 39 In other words, reaching the "wrong" page
is often the product of consumer choice. Extralegal means of preventing
confusion also exist, for search engines are in competition with one
another to ensure that they produce results that are likely to be useful to
web surfers. 14 Last, the "free riding," if any, by the junior user does not
result in any displacement of the senior user's product. Like the generic
drug displayed next to the brand name, the senior user's web site will
still be listed by the search engine if it contains the relevant search terms.
Merely appearing on the same computer-generated list should not cause
actionable confusion.'14 Further, the marginal increase in search costs
caused by the trademark use of metatags should be weighed against the

137. "The presence and prominence of markings tending to dispel confusion as to the origin,
sponsorship or approval of the goods in question is highly relevant to an inquiry concerning the
similarity of the two trade dresses." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d
1033, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992). This should be true in metatag cases.
138. In Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), Judge Scheindlin noted the
implausibility of Brookfield's metaphor:
Use of the highway billboard metaphor is not the best analogy to a metatag on the Internet. The
harm caused by a misleading billboard on the highway is difficult to correct. In contrast, on the
information superhighway, resuming one's search for the correct web site is relatively simple.
With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can return to the search
engine's results and resume searching for the original web site.
Id. at 320 n.15. Professor McCarthy takes issue with this point, stating that this is merely a
difference of degree, not kind. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 25:69; see also Lisa M. Sharrock,
Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine with the Lanham Act, 25 WHITTLER L. REV. 53, 76
(2003) (arguing diversion costs on the Interet may affect purchasers). But for purposes of search
cost analysis, differences in degree matter greatly.
Curiously, the Brookfield court and others have treated the low costs of error as a reason to
give trademark concerns on the Internet greater attention rather than less. In considering whether
West Coast's use of "moviebuff' as a domain name created a likelihood of confusion, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the ease with which web surfers navigate demonstrates that their standard of
care is low, increasing the likelihood of confusion. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1057; Goto.com, Inc. v.
Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Navigating among web sites involves
practically no effort whatsoever... "). But it is precisely because Internet navigation is so low cost
that web surfers need not exercise care in visiting a site. If they hit the wrong one, the expenditures
of correction are minimal. For the view that these costs may matter, see Sharrock, supra.
139. As does Google, currently the most popular search engine.
140. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 25:69 (noting rise of Google based on the
effectiveness of its search algorithm).
141. Compare Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993) ("That a
person cannot tell the difference between the two from across the room matters little. We are dealing
here with customer confusion when choosing to purchase, or not purchase, the items, not public
confusion at viewing them from afar.") (emphasis added).
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existing clutter that already fills search engine results from other uses of
42
a mark. 1
On the flip side, metatag use of trademarks may provide value to
search engine users by providing them with a low-cost list of web sites
that are related to the subject of their search. Though Brookfield did not
raise the issue, courts and commentators alike recognize that few people
expect search engines to automatically connect a trademark to the web
site of its owner. 43 Search engine users may type trademarks into search
engines because doing so will result in hits other than that of the
trademark holder because web searches are a tool for finding related
items as well as specific ones. 144 By using the trademark of a competitor
in a metatag, a web site is essentially telling search engines that it is in
the same category as the senior user. 145 Provided that any confusion is

142. For example, a Google search for "Pepsi" on July 19, 2004, produced approximately
1,790,000 hits. Because Google does not recognize metatags, 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 25:69,
they played no role in creating this clutter. A case from the Southern District of New York recently
recognized that searching for a trademark on a search engine may produce thousands of hits that
have nothing to do with purportedly infringing acts. Strange Music, Inc. v. Strange Music, Inc., No.
04 Civ. 02915(PKC), 2004 WL 1488414, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2004).
143. See, e.g., Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 294; Terrell W. Mills, METATAGS: Seeking to Evade User Detection
and the Lanham Act, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 22, 26 (2000).
144. See Nathenson, supra note 105, at 79-81. Nathenson explains that Interet searches lie on
a spectrum of targeted searches to conceptual inquiries. Conceptual inquiries fall into two categories:
categorical and relational. A categorical search looks for information within a term's category, as
searching "movies" would produce information about "Casablanca" or "Citizen Kane." A relational
search "seeks output that is inferred from the query term," so "one might use 'Princess Diana' to
search about information about royalty in general." Id. at 80-81. Nathenson notes that "[a]s one
moves along the continuum from targeted to conceptual, one's expectations of high precision or
recall becomes less reasonable." Id. at 81. Thus, if one is looking for a pain reliever, but only knows
the name "Tylenol," she may type that term into a search engine even though she is not specifically
looking for the Tylenol site. See Stephen W. Feingold, Trademarks: Means to Avoid Confusion, or
Property Rights. Two Pending Cases Outline Dilemma, 222 N.Y. L.J. no. 17, at S2, col. 3 (1999)
("[Olne highly ethical and respected advertising executive specializing in the Internet ... believes
that someone entering HONDA in a search engine is just as likely looking for information about
Japanese cars as for information specifically about Honda."). One commentator disagrees that
consumers should be able to use trademarks as shortcuts, making the curious claim that "consumer
education" will enable such consumers to get information with other methods. Chad J. Doellinger,
Trademarks, Metatags, and Initial Interest Confusion: A Look to the Past to Reconceptualize the
Future, 41 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 173, 210 (2001); see also Note, Confusion in Cyberspace:
Defending and Recalibratingthe Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2406
(2004). This overlooks the fact that trademarks are information-rich terms. Returning again to the
soy milk anecdote, many soy milks are, well, terrible. If I like Silk and am looking for a soy milk
that mimics its flavor, but at a lower price, "Silk" is a helpful search term in a way that "soy milk"
alone is not.
145. See Lastowka, supra note 102, at 861 (describing the role of metatags in keyword
searches); cf Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal.
1999). Playboy involved a search engine accepting payment to allow certain advertisements to
appear when a web user used "playboy" or "playmate" as search terms. In rejecting the claim that
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quickly dispelled, the metatag use is a potential avenue to give
consumers information. 146 Treating such use as unfair competition makes
unwarranted assumptions. Brookfield does not explain why a metatag
necessarily means "I am the trademark" and not "I am like the
trademark."'' 47 When metatags are used in the latter sense, the balance
this arrangement infringed on Playboy's trademark, the district court distinguished Brookfield in part
by arguing that a different analogy applied:
Here, the analogy is quite unlike that of a devious placement of a road sign bearing false
information. This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in
response to a sign that reads "Fast Food Burgers" to find a well-known fast food burger
restaurant, next to which stands a billboard that reads: "Better Burgers: I Block Further." The
driver, previously enticed by the prospect of a burger from the well-known restaurant, now
decides she wants to explore other burger options. Assuming that the same entity owns the
land on which both the burger restaurant and the competitor's billboard stand, should that
entity be liable to the burger restaurant for diverting the driver? That is the rule [plaintiff]
contends the Court should adopt.
Id. at 1075. The effectiveness of this distinction is questionable. Using metatags to allow a web page
to be listed in search engine results alongside the page of a trademark owner, at issue in Brookfield,
is analogous to the Netscape situation as well. The only difference is that one situation involved
payment to the search engine while the other did not. The court did not explain why payment saves
the practice from being "devious."
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit was also not persuaded and reversed the district court.
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). Applying
Brookfield, the court found a triable issue of fact as to whether users might click on the ads thinking
they were related to the plaintiffs marks. "Even if they realize 'immediately upon accessing' the
competitor's site that they have reached a site 'wholly unrelated to' PEI's, the damage has been
done." Id. at 1025 (quoting Brookfield Commun. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th
Cir.)).
The court noted, however, that under Playboy's theory, banner advertisements that were clear
about their source would not give rise to confusion. Id. at n.16; see also id. at 1030 ("We are also not
addressing a situation in which advertisers or defendants overtly compare PEI's products to a
competitor's-saying, for example, 'if you are interested in Playboy, you may also be interested in
the following message from [a different named company]."') (brackets in original). In a concurrence
that criticized Brookfield's reasoning for not treating metatagging the way analogous behavior in the
brick and mortar world would be treated, Judge Berzon pointed out that under Brookfield's logic, the
alternative suggested by the court might not preclude a conclusion that initial interest confusion
exists. Id. at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring).
146. Professor McCarthy has worried that permitting metatag use of trademarks would lead to
the insertion of irrelevant trademarks in metatags, thus harming Internet navigation. See 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 25:69. But the above analysis does not treat "spamdexing" as an act
that benefits the public. See generally Nathenson, supra note 105. Initial interest confusion is likely
to be applied when the products in question are in relative proximity. See infra notes 175-177 and
accompanying text. The metatag use that is the subject of the current inquiry concerns related web
sites, not, for example, an attempt to draw search engine attention to a pornographic site by using the
trademark "Coca-Cola." This latter problem has drawn recent congressional attention. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252B (2004) (criminalizing the use of misleading domain names to deceive a person into viewing
obscenity or a minor into viewing material harmful to minors).
147. This shortcoming was anticipated by Thomas F. Presson & James R. Barney, Trademarks
as Metatags: Infringement or Fair Use?, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 147 (1998). Addressing the road sign
metaphor, which had been raised in pre-Brookfield cases, they wrote:
While technically correct, this analogy is not inclusive of all the possible legitimate uses that a
bed and breakfast owner could make of a trademark metatag. For instance, why is it
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between harms and benefits tilts against policing
metatag use of
48
trademarks as actionable initial interest confusion.
2. What About Domain Names?
In light of the ease with which potential confusion from metatag
use is dispelled, and the potential benefits to consumers, the Ninth
Circuit erred in deeming actionable the metatag use in Brookfield. The
case for policing domain name use because of initial interest confusion
appears stronger. 49 Though the costs of diversion remain low, several
factors suggest that the harms of diversion will outweigh the benefits.
First, consumers who type a trademark as a domain name are more likely
to be seeking the mark's owner than a company in the same line of
business as the mark holder. 150 Second, the diversion has a greater

necessarily true that the insertion of the term "SHERATON®" in the bed and breakfast
owner's web site is equivalent to saying, "this way to the Sheraton?" It could also be
interpreted to mean: (1)"if you are interested in the SHERATON®, we have cheaper rates;" or
(2) "our bed and breakfast is located just minutes from the SHERATON®;" or (3) "if the
SHERATON® is full, try us;" or (4) "three out of four travelers prefer us to the
SHERATON®." Likewise, the bed and breakfast owner could simply erect his billboard right
next to SHERATON®'s billboard (zoning laws permitting) so that drivers would be forced to
look at both signs at the same time. All of these would be considered legitimate forms of
comparative advertising and as such are encouraged under FTC policy.
Id. at 173-74 (footnotes omitted).
148. In its analysis of whether use of "moviebuff' as a domain name was likely to confuse,
Brookfield acknowledged that the diversion caused by use of the mark could benefit consumers.
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1057 ("A consumer who was originally looking for Brookfield's products or
services may be perfectly content with West Coast's database (especially when itis offered free of
charge); but he reached West Coast's site because of its use of Brookfield's mark as its second-level
domain name, which is a misappropriation of Brookfield's goodwill by West Coast.") (emphasis
added). If the databases are of equal quality, the purported confusion would benefit the consumer in
the court's hypothetical.
Indeed, by broadening the consumer's choice of web sites, the purported confusion may
enhance competition and give web sites an incentive to invest in making their site preferable to
consumers as a specific destination-for example, by creating a user-friendly interface-such that
consumers will seek it out to the exclusion of competitors. Aggressively policing initial interest
confusion, by contrast, discourages such investment by allowing trademark owners to reap the
benefits of visitors for whom the mark functions as a generic. See supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text. Contra Confusion in Cyberspace, supra note 144 at 2404. Again, trademark
holders are expected to ensure that their marks do not become generic. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15,
§ 12:26.
149. Brookfield found that there was a likelihood of confusion between West Coast's using
"moviebuff.com" and Brookfield's "MovieBuff' trademark. The court did not resort to initial
interest confusion in this analysis.
150. Courts have assumed that Internet users expect that a web site with a domain name that is
a trademark will be connected to the trademark's owner. See, e.g., SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp.
2d 542, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1999); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 25:73 ("[T]hrough habit and
convention, Internet users have come to expect that to reach the web site of a company they should
be able to type in the name of the company or its major trademark... ").
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displacement effect.1 51 Domain names are rivalrous; metatags are not. A
web surfer who cannot access a sought-after web site by typing the
trademark as a domain name has lost that avenue for reaching his desired
site. 152 In contrast, a search engine user who hits the wrong site can
return to her result list or refine her search. So there appears to be a
basis-though by no means ironclad' 53-for
concluding that the
aggregate costs of "mislabeled" web sites justify granting a property
right to trademark holders in the use of their marks as domain names.
It is worth noting that courts need not have the final say on these
disputes. Congress has enacted legislation designed to give trademark
holders the ability to use their marks as domain names, even when
another party has beaten them to online registration.154 Given Congress's
willingness to act, some judicial modesty with respect to novel initial
interest confusion claims may be in order.
3. A Problem of Technology or Doctrine?

By refusing to balance the harms and benefits to consumers of
metatag use, the Ninth Circuit opened the door to wider application of
the "strong view" of initial interest confusion.' 55 For the most part,
commentators have treated Brookfield's shortcomings as a failure by the

15 1.See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
152. Brookfield made this point in considering whether "moviebuff.com" would also be an
infringing use of the "MovieBuff' trademark. "Consumers may wrongly assume that the
"MovieBuff' database they were searching for is no longer offered, having been replaced by West
Coast's entertainment database, and thus simply use the services at West Coast's web site."
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1057. This analysis only applies to a use like "pepsi.com." There is no
similar
displacement
with a
site devoted
to comparative
advertising
named
"cokeisbetterthanpepsi.com" or a site dedicated to criticism called "pepsisucks.com."
153. Many uses of a trademark as a domain name may provide information of value to web
surfers. For example, consumers typing a trademark as a domain name may be directed to a site
established to criticize the trademark holder. SNA, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53. The web site may also
be a seller of the trademark holder's products, products derived from the trademark holder, or
otherwise affiliated with the trademark holder. Nonetheless, courts have used initial interest
confusion to quash these uses of trademarks. See, e.g., Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Tech., L.L.C., 319
F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003) (suit by truck manufacturer against used truck locator service); Trans Union
L.L.C. v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. II1.2001) (affiliated company that sold
derivative products); SNA, supra, (criticism), Bear Steams Cos. v. Lavalle, 2002 WL 31757771, No.
Civ. A. 3:OOCV1900D (Dec. 3, 2002) (criticism, but permitting domain names that are themselves
critical); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 191 ("[E]ven if the user will easily
recognize, upon reaching defendants' web site, that it is only a parody, the use of plaintiffs' mark as
the site's domain name ... creates initial interest confusion.
). But see Northland Ins. Cos. v.
Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn. 2000).
154. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act creates liability for those who, with a
"bad faith intent to profit" from another's trademark, use a domain name that is identical or
confusingly similar to a famous trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
155. See supraPart I.E.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 28:97

court to understand the Internet's nature. 56 They also criticize the court
for using the wrong metaphor to describe search engines and metatag
57
use, preferring discount bins and store shelves to highway billboards.'
Though correct as far as it goes, an analysis of Brookfield on this basis
overlooks the more fundamental problem: Nothing in the doctrine of
initial interest confusion precluded the court from ruling as it did. In
creating the doctrine of initial interest confusion, Steinway, Mobil, and
other precedents emphasized consumer diversion; they did not calibrate
the degree of diversion necessary.' 58 Nor did these courts cast the initial
156. See, e.g., Dan McCuaig, Halve the Baby: An Obvious Solution to the Troubling Use of
Trademarks as Metatags, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 643, 662 (2000) (arguing that
Brookfield "rest[s] on a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which Internet search engines
operate"); Shannon N. King, Note, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 313-14 (2000) ("[T]his ruling employs an unusual confusion
analysis that does not take into account the unique expectations of Internet consumers."); Lastowka,
supra note 102, at 857-59 (criticizing Brookfield's billboard metaphor); Tom Monagan, Note, Can
an Invisible Word Create Confusion? The Need for Clarity in the Law of Trademark Infringement
Through Internet Metatags, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 973, 998 (2001) (arguing that metatags cannot create
visual associations); Rajzer, supra note 126, at 456 ("[The billboard metaphor] fails to address the
ease of movement from one web site to another .... "); Jonathan A. Weininger, Note, Trademark
Metatagging: Lanham Act Liability or Pareto Optimality, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 469, 497 (2001)
(criticizing billboard metaphor); Bryce J. Maynard, Note, The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
and Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303, 1338 (2000)
("[Mianipulative metatagging is not the same as ordering Coke and receiving Pepsi instead; it is
more akin to ordering Coke and having a waiter ask 'Is Pepsi okay?' The potential consumer is faced
with a number of alternate choices and must make a reasonable, informed decision.") (footnote
omitted); Mills, supra note 143, at 27-29 (discussing the absence of visible trademark use). But see,
e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 25:69 (praising Brookfield); Doellinger, supra note 144, at
173-74 (agreeing with Brookfield's outcome); id. at 216 (arguing that "improper use of goodwill
occurs by placing the trademark in one's metatags, and thus the diversion and harm occurs merely
by having the web site appear on the search engine results list"). Several commentators suggested
that initial interest confusion was not the proper framework for analysis before the Brookfield ruling.
See, e.g., Presson & Barney, supra note 147, at 173-74 (discussing flaw of highway analogy);
O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 304; Nathenson, supra note 105, at 115-18; Michael R. Sees, Use of
Another's Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag: Why Liability Should Not Ensue Under the Lanham
Act for Trademark Infringement, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 99, 117-18 (1998) (noting that metatag
inclusion may be an avenue for comparative advertising, which aids consumers).
157. See, e.g., McCuaig, supra note 156, at 662-63 (likening situation in Brookfield to a store
in which West Coast and Brookfield's products are stacked next to each other); Presson & Barney,
supra note 147, at 166 (likening metatag use to a store that displays Tylenol next to generic brand);
King, supra note 156, at 325 ("The court's analogy over-emphasizes the costs involved in getting off
at the wrong 'cyber-exit' compared with a real highway exit. It takes just a few mouse clicks and a
couple of seconds to 'go back' on the Internet."); Lastowka, supra note 102, at 859-62 (likening
search engines to a thrift store with large bins, and metatags as requests to be placed in one or
another bin); see also Mark T. Garrett, Recent Developments in Trademark Law, 8 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 101, 106 (1999) (arguing that a better analogy "is the placement of one's billboard beside
a competitor's billboard, or the placement of one's business near a competitor's business. In these
cases, as in the case of competing hits on a hit list, a consumer is presented with two equally
accessible options").
158. Though several criticisms of Brookfield take it to task for failing to consider potential
information benefits to consumers of the use of trademarks in metatags, see, e.g., Maynard, supra
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interest confusion doctrine in terms of consumer protection. The
emphasis was always on the trademark owner's goodwill. 5 9 Though
many courts stayed their hand in situations where the confusion was
likely negligible, 60 others found initial interest confusion simply because
consumers had to16 engage
in "mental processes," long before the Internet
1
became an issue.

The broad view taken by the Ninth Circuit (which neglected
consumer search costs), though arguably a break from majority practice
and inconsistent with several specific applications, was not a break in
initial interest confusion doctrine. Simply put, Brookfield was a
precedential accident waiting to happen-a point made 62
clear by the
court's reliance on previous initial interest confusion cases. 1
C. Brookfield's Aftermath:
"Strong" InitialInterest Confusion on the Internet
Brookfield ushered in a trend of Internet cases that failed to
consider search costs in upholding claims based on initial interest
confusion. 63 Whatever rough balancing that had characterized the
doctrine's application in the brick and mortar world was lost.
1. Inviting Strong Claims
Brookfield contained several invitations to strong initial interest
confusion claims. First and foremost, the case relied on the goodwill
theory of initial interest confusion.' 64 Bolstered by the misleading
analogy of metatags to highway billboards, the doctrine as applied had
65
no limiting mechanism designed to consider consumer interests.1
Second, in its discussion of whether the moviebuff.com domain name
was infringing, the court viewed the ease of navigating the Internet as
note 156, at 1338; Garrett, supra note 157, at 106, these critiques do not address the initial interest
confusion doctrine more generally.
159. The application of goodwill protections on the Internet has led critics to question the
wisdom of protecting goodwill at all. See Presson & Barney, supra note 147, at 174 ("[Tlhe 'spirit'
of trademark protection is not to protect the investment that trademark owners may choose to make
in extensive and costly advertising, but rather, to protect consumers against the nuisance of
confusing and misleading marks.").
160. See supra Part I.D.
161. See supra Part I.E.
162. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 ("Recently in Dr. Seuss, we explicitly recognized that the
use of another's trademark in a manner calculated 'to capture initial consumer attention, even though
no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion, may be still an infringement.' Dr.
Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1405 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257-58
(2d Cir. 1987)).").
163. See infra Part II.C.2.
164. See supra Part l.B.
165. See id.
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raisingthe likelihood of consumer confusion, and neglected to consider
that web surfers would take into account the strong likelihood of mis-hits
when web surfing. 166 This erroneous view is likely to be compounded in
the future as more Internet neophytes become acquainted with the "false
starts and excursions awaiting [Internet users] in this evolving
medium.",167 Moreover, to the extent that a web site employing a
trademark in its metatags becomes a site that "looks like" another,
Brookfield's failure to consider consumer expectations clashes
with
68
several trade dress cases that consider initial interest confusion.'
Third, Brookfield removed initial interest analysis from the
multifactor Polaroid-style likelihood-of-confusion test. Although courts
have recognized that initial interest confusion might be a stand-alone
trademark injury, they generally consider such confusion as part of the
multifactor test. 169 Because other factors may cut against a finding of
likelihood of confusion, treating initial interest confusion independently
70
of the multifactor test improves the prospects of any given claim.1
Brookfield elevated de minimis confusion to a recognized cause of
action. Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases sought to temper some of
Brookfield's implications, but without alleviating the root of the problem:
the case's reliance on a subjective, and ultimately standardless goodwill
analysis. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 17 1 the court picked up
Brookfield's suggestion that metatag use of a trademark may
nevertheless be permissible. Playboy sought to prevent a former
Playmate of the Year from identifying herself as such on her Internet
web site. The court held that Welles, the defendant, could include the
terms "playboy" and "playmate" in her metatags as a nominative use of

166. See supra note 138.
167. Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
168. See, e.g., Doff-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
initial interest confusion claim because "where product configurations are at issue, consumers are
generally more likely to think that a competitor has entered the market with a similar product").
169. See supra note 35.
170. Brookfield Commun. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 n.24 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Because we agree that the traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for analyzing the metatags
issue, we do not attempt to fit our discussion into one of the Sleekcraft factors."). The Ninth Circuit
later clarified that it did not exclude multifactor analysis from all discussion of Internet initial
interest confusion. Intersteller Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2002)

("Of course, the remainder of the Sleekcraft factors complete the case-by-case inquiry necessary to
evaluate initial interest confusion on the Internet."). See also Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commun.
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); cf Cody, supra note 24 (criticizing application of initial
interest confusion to the Internet when the traditional likelihood-of-confusion test would produce
better results).
171. 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the trademarks. 72 In its holding, the court noted its concern that
restricting nominative uses in metatags might "hinder[]the free flow of
information on the internet, something which is certainly not a goal of
trademark law."' 173 But this statement does not explain why the
information available from the former Playmate's web site is more
valuable to consumers than would be information about products similar
to Playboy's from a competitor's site (one who, unlike Welles, lacked a
past link to the company). Ensuring the free flow of information would
dictate similar treatment in each situation, especially since each presents
the same potential for diversion. Further, the court persisted in its view
that there is something inappropriate about metatag use. Welles's use of
metatags was permissible in part because Playboy's web site still
appeared first in search engine results. That is, Welles could seek to
appear on a search engine result with Playboy, but she could not be too
successful at doing so.' 74
The Ninth Circuit also pulled back from suggesting that any
similarity among web site domain names constituted initial interest
confusion. InterstellarStarshipServices, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc. 175 held that the
question whether domain names that incorporated trademarks caused
initial interest confusion depended on the similarity of the products (thus
permitting use of www.apple.com by an apple grower who did not sell
computers) and the notoriety of the mark (thus prohibiting an apple
grower from drawing hits by using www.DRSEUSS.com). 176 Although
these distinctions can be defended based177on search costs, the court's
analysis focused on the goodwill rationale.
172. Id. at 803. The three-factor test for permissive nominative use employed by the court
requires that (1) the mark be used only when there is no adequate descriptive substitute; (2) the
defendant use no more of the mark than necessary; and (3) the defendant do nothing to suggest
sponsorship or endorsement of the mark holder. Id. at 801.
173. Id. at 804.
174. Id. ("We note that our decision might differ if the metatags listed the trademarked term so
repeatedly that Welles' site would regularly appear above [Playboy's] in searches for one of the
trademarked terms.").
175. 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
176. Id. at 943-44. See also Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., Nos. 02-57148, 0355236, 03-55017, 03-55144, 2004 WL 1753289, at *13 (9th Cir. August 6, 2004) ("Nissan
Computer's use of nissan.com to sell non-automobile-related goods does not infringe because Nissan
is a last name, a month in the Hebrew and Arabic calendars, a name used by many companies, and
'the goods offered by these two companies differ significantly.' However, Nissan Computer traded
on the goodwill of Nissan Motor by offering links to automobile-related websites.") (quoting
Interstellar,304 F.3d at 944).
177. Interstellar,304 F.3d at 945 ("If a rogue company adopts as its domain name a protected
trademark and proceeds to sell goods similar to those offered by the trademark owner, it necessarily
free rides on the trademark owner's goodwill, and that rogue company benefits from increasing
initial interest confusion as consumers exercise lower levels of care in making their purchasing
decisions.") (emphases added).
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2. Picking Up the Baton
Prior to Brookfield, initial interest cases rarely found that fleeting
confusion mattered, 178 but such examples are increasingly common.
Several courts followed Brookfield's lead by prohibiting the metatag use
of trademarks. 79 The resulting opinions ignored the ease with which
confusion could be dispelled,
focusing instead on the purported
80
1
goodwill.
of
misappropriation
Many courts also employed initial interest confusion to give
trademark owners effective property rights to use their marks as domain
names, notwithstanding the prior registration of the domain by a third
18
party.' 8' For example,
in OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 182 a
district court considered a parody site of the Buffalo News with the
domain name "thebuffalonews.com." In rejecting defendants' disclaimer
Although the court's concern with product similarity echoes a similar concern in the preInternet initial interest cases, see supra text accompanying note 84, it is misplaced in the Internet
context. In the brick and mortar world, product likeness is significant because the difference in
products is what easily dispels any consumer illusions. On the Internet, it is the obvious differences
in web pages, competing or not, that does so. If a competing product has a web page that is
confusingly similar to a trademark holder's, then the proper cause of action is for infringement based
on likelihood of point-of-sale confusion, not its initial interest cousin.
Nonetheless, numerous cases have applied the proximate product test to address initial interest
claims. See Network Network v. CBS, Inc., 2000 WL 362016, 54 U.S.P.Q. 1150 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18,
2000), at *9 ("A trademark violation based on initial interest confusion involves the junior user
capitalizing on the senior user's goodwill. The senior user's customers, at least tangentially in the
market for the junior user's services, accidentally access the infringing site while in search of
information on the senior user's products. Thus, relatedness of products is an important component
in the analysis, even if the products need not be closely related.... Unlikely indeed is the hapless
Internet searcher who, unable to find information on the schedule of upcoming NASCAR broadcasts
of "Dukes of Hazzard" reruns, decides to give up and purchase a computer network maintenance
seminar instead."). See also Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(rejecting initial interest claim because of product differences); Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115
F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1121 (D. Minn. 2000) (initial interest confusion not reflective of likelihood of
confusion when use of trademark as domain name was not commercial); Bigstar Entm't, Inc. v. Next
Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (no Internet initial interest confusion when
non-competitors, non-identical web sites, weak marks, differing products, third-party use of similar
trade names, no intentional use of plaintiff marks in metatags, and no evidence of defendant bad
faith). Not all courts have required competition to find initial interest confusion. See, e.g., N.Y. State
Soc'y of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
178. See supra Part I.E.
179. See, e.g., Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002)
(following Brookfleld); Bayer Corp. v. Custom School Frames, L.L.C., 259 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509
(E.D. La. 2003) (same); Soc "yof Certified Public Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 342 ("When
[visitors] arrive instead at Defendant's web site, they cannot help being confused-even if only
momentarily.").
180. Promatek, 300 F.3d at 812-13 ("What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it
is the misappropriation of [plaintiff's] goodwill. [Defendant] cannot unring the bell.").
181. See, e.g., cases cited in note 153; Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Tech., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243 (6th
Cir. 2003).
182.86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
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defense, the court explained that "the problem with this argument is that
it ignores the initial interest confusion caused by defendants' use of the
plaintiffs' mark. Internet users entering 'thebuffalonews.com' domain
name are expecting to arrive at The Buffalo News' web site. When they
arrive instead at defendants' web site they cannot help being confusedeven if only momentarily.'' 183 Though the court purported to make a
finding of fact that Internet users will guess at domain names, the only
citation for its conclusion was to Brookfield.184 The court concluded that
the labeling causes the expenditure of "time and energy" for those who
access the defendants' site, but did not balance the "momentar[y]"
confusion against other consumer interests.' 85 The court also discarded
consideration of consumer sophistication as a means of sorting between
valid and invalid initial interest confusion claims. Instead,86it followed
Brookfield's lead and downplayed this factor's significance.'
In many cases, courts applying strong initial interest confusion to
the Internet have found actionable infringement where no such
infringement was found in the "real world."' 187 This has produced
doctrinal tension in some circuits between Internet initial interest
confusion cases and prior case law involving parties operating in the

183. Id. at 190 (emphases added).
184. Id. at 180 (citing Brookfield Commun. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir.
1999)). This is not to say that such expectations do not exist or that no evidence can be adduced for
them. See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2000),
afid, Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., No. 00-55678, 2000 WL 1875821 (9th Cir. Dec.
26, 2000) (citing survey evidence that ninety-two percent of consumers would expect to find
information about cars at nissan.com or nissan.net web sites). Some courts have demanded evidence
of actual initial interest confusion on the Internet. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233
F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000).
185. Spotlight Magazine, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
186. Id. at 195.
187. For example, in SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D. Pa. 1999), the district court
granted a preliminary injunction in favor of an airplane kit manufacturer (Seawind) against a
newsletter company that used the name "seawind.net" to post its "Seawind Builders Newsletter."
The court ruled that the web site name would cause initial confusion, but denied the motion against
the use of "seawind" in the newsletter, which was also published on paper. Id. at 551-53. Though
the content of the media were largely the same, the court treated them differently. One could try to
justify this result under the search cost rationale by the fact that the Internet creates a new low-cost
avenue for information about a product. To summon information about Seawind, one need only type
that name into a web browser. For this to work, the trademark domain name must be set aside for the
trademark owner, who is the party most likely to have the incentive to create information at the web
site attached to its mark. Allowing a third party to take the name eliminates the opportunity to lower
search costs if third parties are deemed less likely as a class to provide useful information about the
subject of the domain name. This argument would not similarly apply to metatags, for search engine
results lists can present multiple options.
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brick and mortar context. 88 Similarly, the doctrine has been applied to
89
Internet controversies outside the domain name and metatag context.'
Courts have also considered initial confusion as a90 more robust part of the
multifactor test when applying it to the Internet.
D. Holdouts: "Weak" Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet
Not all courts have followed Brookfield's lead. Some judges
considering Internet-based claims of initial interest confusion have issued
opinions suggesting that the nature of the confusion caused by using
trademarks in domain names or metatags does not warrant a suit under
the Lanham Act, but these cases have not involved competing
products. 191
188. Compare Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002)
(metatag case in which "[wihat is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the
misappropriation of [plaintiff's] goodwill"), with Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225 (7th
Cir. 1993) (despite creator's statement that "MIKE" mark was to trick those glancing from across
room to think shirt was "NIKE," "a jury could surely conclude that any initial confusion ends with a
closer look, when the observer 'gets it"').
189. See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
190. In Trans Union L.L.C. v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Ill. 2001), a
district court considered an infringement claim based on the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
trademark or logo in its domain name and metatags. Although there was no evidence that anyone
accessed defendant's web site thinking they would reach the plaintiff's, the court still weighed the
actual confusion factor in plaintiffs favor based on the prospect of Internet-based initial interest
confusion. Id. at 1044 ("But with regard to the logo and the transunioncredit domain name, the risk
of initial interest confusion tips this element of the test in favor of Trans Union.") (emphasis added).
See also, e.g., Pa. Bus. Bank v. Biz Bank Corp., No. 01-2529, 2004 WL 1799657, at *10-11 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (weighing actual confusion factor in plaintiffs favor despite lack of evidence
based on expected initial interest confusion due to domain name similarity to plaintiffs mark).
191. See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding
computer company's clue.com web site does not cause initial interest confusion with board game
Clue and noting "in a case involving such disparate products and services as this, the court's refusal
to enter the 'initial interest confusion' thicket is well taken given the unlikelihood of 'legally
significant' confusion"). See also Strange Music, Inc. v. Strange Music, Inc., No. 04 Civ.
02915(PKC), 2004 WL 1488414, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2004) (declining to find that goods were
proximate because of purported initial interest confusion stemming from search engine results and
noting low correction costs); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(initial interest confusion not cognizable between non-competing sites); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F.
Supp. 2d 309, 320-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (trademark use in metatags fair and use on site critical of
trademark owner would "provide users with information about [plaintiff]"); Teletech Customer Care
Mgmt. Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (pre-Brookfield case stating
that "brief' initial confusion of browsers typing trademark name as domain name is "not cognizable
under the trademark laws"). Again, these cases did not involve proximate products in competition.
One district court indicated a willingness to permit a goods reseller to incorporate the trademark of
the source of the goods in its metatags, but granted a temporary restraining order against such use
based on its view that the reseller's site was misleading. Bernina of Am., Inc. v. All Brands Sewing
Machines & Sergers, 57 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1883 (N.D. 11. 2001) ("If AllBrands' web site was not
confusing to customers, then an injunction of AllBrands' use of the Bernina and Bernette trademarks
in its metatags would be improper because such use merely directs customers to the location where
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At least one court has suggested that the policy questions raised by
initial interest confusion on the Internet are better left to Congress than to
judges. 9 2 There is no reason why not. As discussed above, Congress has
already intervened in the area of domain names.193
E. Consequences
Though some fear that initial interest confusion precedents may
stymie the Internet's development,' 94 the heavens are unlikely to fall if
Pepsi must use a metatag that says "Pepsi is better than Coke" rather than
a tag that simply says "Coke." Indeed, the market may moot the metatag
issue, as search engines seek to defeat spamdexing by ignoring
metatags.1 95 As for use of trademarks as domain names, Congress has
largely resolved the debate over whether trademark owners should have
dibs on their use by passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection

Act. 196
Though the disputes that generated Brookfield and its progeny are
of fading importance, initial interest confusion remains highly relevant to
the Internet. Other online practices are coming under legal attack. The
initial interest cases have spurred litigation over the search engine
practice of selling banner advertisements to be displayed in response to
trademark-based searches.1 97 The Ninth Circuit has already approved
such litigation under Brookfield's logic.1 98 If successful, these suits could
stifle development of search engine technology by impeding access to
advertising revenue.
Similarly, litigation is underway challenging the propriety of
Internet "pop-up" ads that are keyed to visits to a competitor's web site.
These challenges have produced mixed results to date.' 99
Initial interest confusion cases involving the Internet are also
important because of their effects beyond the online context. By carrying
a flawed doctrine to its extreme, these precedents threaten to reach
they may purchase genuine branded goods from a reseller that does not hold itself out to be anything
but an independent retailer unaffiliated with Bemina.").
192. See Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
193. See supra note 154.

194. See, e.g., Maynard, supra note 156, at 1343-44.
195. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 25:69 (noting that by 2003, seventy-five percent of
Internet searches used Google, which does not use metatags); Lastowka, supra note 103.
196. See supra note 154.
197. See Lastowka, supra note 103; G. Rita A. Abbati, Metatags, Keywords,and Links: Recent
Developments Addressing Trademark Threats in Cyberspace, 40 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 341, 358-60
(2003).
198. See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
199. Compare Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich.
2003), with 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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beyond metatags and back into the "real" world to complicate what were
once easy cases. More broadly, the expansion of initial interest confusion
may be viewed as a symptom of a larger trend: efforts by intellectual
property holders to control any evocation of their protected marks.
1. Brookfield's Brick and Mortar Legacy
Brookfield and its progeny did not revolutionize the initial interest
confusion doctrine. For the most part, these cases applied the same
standardless goodwill reasoning that had characterized the doctrine from
its inception. 0° What these cases provided was not new doctrine, but
rather new examples of the doctrine's strong form. The consequence may
be more ambitious initial interest claims outside the Internet context.
Having opened the door to initial interest claims that do not implicate
consumer interests in one medium, courts have difficulty rejecting
analogous claims in another.
Shell Trademark Management v. Canadian American Oil Co.
presents an example of the reductio ad absurdum of an initial interest
claim.20 1 Defendant Canadian, a Shell franchisee, advertised and sold
Shell gasoline at its gas station. Canadian also sold its own cheaper
brand, called Touchless. Unsurprisingly, Canadian advertised both
products and displayed a Touchless sign beneath a more prominent Shell
sign. Relying on Brookfield, Shell sued, claiming initial interest
confusion. 0 2 There was no similarity between the two gasoline brand
names, and Canadian actually sold both products at its station. Anyone
pulling to a pump selling Touchless gas had only to move a few feet to a
Shell pump, if Shell gas was what he actually wanted. 0 3
Little separates Canadian from a store that sells and advertises both
Coke and Pepsi. Nonetheless, the court had difficulty explaining why
Brookfield did not apply. Though consumers had no trouble moving to a
Shell pump if they had been diverted to the Touchless brand, the court
had to concede that "that minor inconvenience is somewhat like the
Internet cases of diversion to the wrong web site, which may be only one
click away from the intended destination. ' 20 4 Indeed, driving a car from
one pump to another is likely more inconvenient than navigating web
sites. 205

200. See, e.g., Brookfield Commun. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999);
Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002).
201. No. 02-01365 EDL, 2002 WL 32104586 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002).

202. Id. at *4.
203. Id.

204. Id.
205. Depending on one's connection speed.
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The court struggled to distinguish Brookfield. First, the court
suggested that because Canadian sold both brands of gasoline, it was
more like a web site that offered both a trademark owner's and a
competitor's products.2 °6 Of course, this is equally true of the results
page generated by a search engine that produces both a trademark
owner's site and the site of a third party that used the trademark in
metatags. Second, the court mused that diversion could be a two-way
street, that perhaps customers would sometimes be diverted to Shell
pumps despite wanting Touchless gas.20 7 But a similar argument could
have been made in Brookfield. One could claim that some consumers
entering a trademark into a search engine were really performing a
categorical search and did not want to see the site of the trademark
owner. 208 Third, the court noted that the initial interest cases cited by
Brookfield concerned the use of similar marks.20 9 Shell claimed,
however, that Canadian drew Touchless customers with the Shell
mark. l°
The court ultimately conceded that these distinctions were not
dispositive. It concluded that Shell had
raised a serious issue as to whether Defendant is in effect
improperly trading on Shell's goodwill through the use of Shell's
prominently displayed sign and trade dress in close proximity to
Touchless gas.., by confusing consumers about whether Touchless
gas is affiliated with Shell, at least initially ....

To do so is to run

afoul of the two basic goals of trademark protection, especially the
goal of protecting the seller's investment in goodwill. 2 11
Shell nicely illustrates the dilemma facing courts that follow
Brookfield. Although Brookfield's reasoning was not novel, it applied
initial interest confusion analysis to facts in which the confusion was so
minor as to be negligible. Once that line was crossed, rejecting the same
22
analysis outside the Internet context became that much more difficult.
206. Shell, 2002 WL 32104586, at *4.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 144.

209. Shell, 2002 WL 32104586, at *4.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *6. Shell also brought dilution claims, which the court also found serious. Id. Shell
arose on the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the balance of
hardships did not justify Shell's requested remedy of an injunction against all sales of the Touchless
brand. Id. at *7. The court was willing to issue an injunction of a lesser scope, but Shell rejected this
option. Id. at *8.
212. Even the competing analogies to metatags as billboards could be characterized as causing
initial interest confusion. See, e.g., Lastowka, supra note 102, at 859-62 (likening search engines to
a thrift store with large bins and metatags as requests to be placed in one or another bin). See supra
note 157 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, if the courts had applied the search cost rationale to initial
interest confusion, no3 cause of action would have been possible in either
21
Brookfield or Shell.
The same problem appears in trade dress cases. As argued above,
claims of trade dress infringement are often analogous to those of initial
interest confusion. Both situations involve potentially confusing
similarities between products that are ultimately distinguishable by
consumers. Similarly, both contexts bring the interests of producers and
consumers into potential tension. 214 Courts often resolve these cases in
the defendant's favor with reasoning that is consistent with the search
cost rationale for initial interest confusion.21 5
Such cases stand in sharp contrast to initial interest cases that reject
the use of disclaimers to ameliorate any initial confusion.2 16 Prior to
Brookfield, some trade dress cases had already been influenced by initial
interest precedents.21 7 And post-Brookfield trade dress cases have
referred to Brookfield's facts to apply a strong form of initial interest
confusion to the brick and mortar world. 2 18 This development runs

213. Compare Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (criticizing Brookfield's logic for being akin to finding infringement
when one brand displays its wares near another's).
214. In the trade dress context, the risk exists that an attractive product design may not be
freely copied because a court deems it to be a protected trade dress. See, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts,
944 F.2d 1235, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority opinion ... protects
the source of the goods, Ferrari, against plaintiffs copying of its design even if the replication is
accompanied by adequate labeling so as to prevent consumer confusion.").
215. See supra notes 69-72 and 89-91 and accompanying text.
216. See OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
217. See, e.g., Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167, 1180 (N.D.N.Y.
1995). See also Sara Lee Corp. v. Am. Leather Prods., No. 97 C 4158, 1998 WL 433764, at *17
(N.D. Ill. July 29, 1998) (noting infringing trade dress would likely cause initial interest confusion
among consumers).
218. In Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2002), a magistrate
judge concluded that an athletic shoe's four-stripe design could potentially infringe on Adidas's
three-stripe trade dress notwithstanding the fact that the junior user's product was labeled with its
own distinct trademark. The judge concluded that initial interest confusion was possible by citing
Brookfield's discussion of Internet diversion.
In the same way, a consumer encountering defendants' shoes at Target may be initially drawn
to them because they appear to be adidas shoes from a distance. The shoes sit side-by-side in
open boxes that are angled so that the customer primarily sees only the shoes, not the word
"B.U.M." on the tongue or the shoebox. This method of display may trade on adidas' Three
Stripe Mark to capture the initial attention of the consumer, which may constitute trademark
infringement.
Id. at 1212 (citation omitted); see also Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P., 311 F.
Supp. 2d 690, 723-24 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (finding infringement in guitar design in part because of
initial interest confusion and citing Brookfield).
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counter to the Supreme Court's21 9recent signal that courts may be too
welcoming of trade dress claims.
2. Initial Interest Confusion, Dilution, and the Right to Evoke
The development of initial interest confusion raises interesting
parallels with the doctrine of trademark dilution. Both doctrines police
the ability of a junior user to bring to mind the senior user's mark in a
manner that does not cause confusion at the point of sale. And both
doctrines have been employed in an increasingly aggressive manner by
the courts. The United States Supreme Court, however, recently
indicated that courts have gone too far with respect to dilution. 22 0 Its
opinion should give pause to courts that are enthusiastic about initial
interest claims.
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") provides a cause of
action when a junior user's use of a trademark or name "causes dilution
of the distinctive quality" of the senior user's mark. 22' Dilution and initial
interest confusion are analogous in two respects. First, both doctrines
protect trademark holders in situations in which traditional point-of-sale
likelihood-of-confusion analysis is unlikely to give them a cause of
action. Second, both doctrines rely on a more subtle understanding of the
consumer mind than is implicated in a traditional point-of-sale confusion
case. Rather than assessing whether consumers are likely to be confused
when making a purchase, dilution is concerned with the associations
consumers may make between two products employing similar marks.
Likewise, initial interest confusion looks to consumer associations by
expanding the universe of actionable confusion to include confusion that
is dispelled before any purchase. As has been seen, this confusion may
involve simply calling to mind the trademark owner's product.222
The lower courts had varied on the degree of association required to
make a dilution case. In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,223 the
Supreme Court set the bar higher than had been the trend in some courts
by holding that the FTDA requires proof of actual (as opposed to likely)
dilution of the senior user's mark.
In the opinion on review, the Sixth Circuit concluded that though
no one would expect a connection between an adult novelty store named
219. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (holding that
product design is not inherently distinctive and may be protected as unregistered trade dress only if it

acquires secondary meaning).
220. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
222. See, e.g., Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

223. 537 U.S. at 432.
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"Victor's Little Secret" and "Victoria's Secret" products, "consumers
who hear the name "Victor's Little Secret" are likely automatically to
think of the more famous store and link it to the [novelty shop]. 224
Again, this "automatic link" echoes the association that forms the basis
of strong initial interest confusion.22 5
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this broad approach:
[A]t least where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact
that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a
famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution ....
[S]uch mental association will not necessarily reduce
226 the capacity of
the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner.
The Court noted that evocation is not dilution. 227 In the initial
interest context, however, some courts treat evocation as infringement.2 28
Recent developments in intellectual property law have been
characterized as a sustained effort by intellectual property owners to
obtain an "exclusive right to evoke" the protected subject. 229 Trademark
law has generally resisted this trend. 230 But just as a low evidentiary
standard for dilution would have represented a break in this tradition, so
does the strong form of the initial interest confusion doctrine.
The Supreme Court's holding in Moseley may be understood as
reinforcing the traditional understanding that trademark does not confer
an exclusive right to evoke and as striking a blow against the creeping
expansion of trademark rights. 23' The expansive application of initial
interest confusion presents the same evocation issue at play in cases
involving broad application of the dilution doctrine. What then to make
224. Id. at 426-27 (quoting V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir.
2001)).
225. See supra Part I.E.

226. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.
227. Id. ("[E]ven though Utah drivers may be reminded of the circus when they see a license
plate referring to the 'greatest snow on earth,' it by no means follows that they will associate 'the
greatest show on earth' with skiing or snow sports, or associate it less strongly or exclusively with
the circus.") (discussing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999)).
228. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.1987).
229. See Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REv. 291 (2003); cf Mark
A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999)

(criticizing trend of treating trademarks as property).
230. See Dogan, supra note 229, at 309; In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973)

("The fact that one mark may bring another mark to mind does not in itself establish likelihood of
confusion as to source."); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:9 ("'Confusion' means more than that
the junior user's mark merely 'calls to mind' the senior user's mark").
231. See Dogan, supra note 229, at 316. In a similar vein, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (holding that product design is not inherently distinctive and
may be protected as unregistered trade dress only if it acquires secondary meaning).
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of the holding that mere "mental processes" represent actionable
confusion?2 32 What then to make of holdings that the momentary (and
perhaps hypothetical) confusion caused by metatags is actionable? Just
as the Supreme Court called for actual evidence of dilution, the search
cost rationale demands that initial interest confusion impose significant
costs before permitting initial interest confusion's application. If
plaintiffs cannot meet this standard, their claims deserve to fall by the
wayside. 3 3
IIl. CONCLUSION

Considerable ink has been spilled on the question whether legal
disputes involving the Internet require new rules, modified rules, or the
same rules that govern the brick and mortar world.2 34 The translation
process is often controversial. Sometimes judges who purport to apply
existing doctrine to the Internet do so in
a manner that arguably twists
235
old doctrines into unrecognizable shapes.

The initial interest confusion doctrine was overdue for some
twisting. Its focus on the goodwill of trademark holders to the exclusion
of consumer interests invited claims that set the interests of consumers
against those of trademark holders. This article has argued that the better
approach would be a doctrine that focuses on search costs. Such a
doctrine would protect consumers while still placing a value
on the
236
goodwill.
holder's
trademark
a
of
misappropriation
purported
By staying their hand when the purported initial confusion was de
minimis, many courts ameliorated the tension at the heart of initial
interest confusion.23 7 But the popularization of the Internet as a
marketing tool brought an increasing number of initial interest claims in
its wake. The proliferation of claims involving de minimis initial
confusion, particularly in the metatag context, gave the courts an
opportunity to reexamine the doctrine. To do otherwise and mechanically
apply goodwill analysis threatened to stifle a source of low-cost
232. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
233. The push to expand initial interest confusion may also be seen as part of a larger drive by
trademark holders to obtain full property rights in their symbols. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999).
234. See, e.g., Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 681 nn.4-6 (2003).
235. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (2003) (reversing intermediate court's

decision that e-mails sent to Intel's employees that were critical of the company constituted a
trespass to chattels of the company's e-mail system though system was not damaged or
commandeered); see generally Dan L. Burke, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING

Bus. L. 27 (2000) (discussing revisions to trespass law necessary if one is to apply it to Internet email).
236. See supra Part I.C.
237. See supra Part I.D.
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information for consumers and harm the free and open competition that
trademark law is intended to protect. For the most part, unfortunately,
courts did otherwise. 238 The consequences threaten to produce
increasingly unbalanced applications of an already flawed doctrine.239
It is a mistake to see this as a problem of technology, though many
courts were certainly guilty of a facile understanding of how the Internet
functions.240 In the end, however, the Internet did not create the doctrinal
problem. Rather, cases involving the Internet made stark the problems at
the core of pre-existing initial interest confusion law.
The difficulty is not wholly intractable. To a large extent, devices
like fair use may temper the impact of initial interest confusion in
cyberspace. Alternatively, a mix of legislative and technological fixes
may help. 24' But these options would still leave a flawed doctrine largely
intact. One hopes instead that courts will see that the imperfect results
that come from applying initial interest confusion to Internet disputes are
a symptom of a larger doctrinal problem. Perhaps this understanding will
lead to recognition of the road not taken at initial interest confusion's
birth and to the creation of a doctrine that harmonizes the interests of
consumers and trademark holders.

238. See supra Parts II.B & I.C.
239. See supra Part II.E.
240. See supra notes 156-157.
24 1. See McCuaig, supra note 156.

